Wednesday, October 15, 2008

9th Circuit BAP: Debt is Dischargeable Under § 523(a)(2)(A) Although Debtor's Knowing and Intentional Misrepresentation Was Reasonably Relied Upon


By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys, Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com



Ghomeshi v. Sabban (In re Sabban)
BAP No. CC-07-1269-MoPaD
February 20, 2008


In this split 2-1 BAP opinion (with Judge Randy Dunn, in his BAP capacity, siding with but not writing the majority opinion), the Court affirmed the bankruptcy court in holding that a $123,000 debt was dischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A) notwithstanding that the transaction involved a misrepresentation by the debtor, which debtor knew to be false, and upon which the creditor has reasonably relied. The BAP relied on a 1998 U.S. Supreme Court opinion interpreting § 523(a)(2), Cohen v. De La Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998). The BAP held that because the debt was based on an underlying state court judgment which clearly awarded the damages to the creditor for violation of a specific statute, and that statutory violation did not arise out of debtor's fraud or misrepresentation, this debt was dischargeable.

The Facts, and The State Court Judgment
Debtor was an unlicensed contractor who contracted with creditor to remodel creditor's home. In a state court action the trial court found that debtor represented to creditor that he was licensed, when he "knew it to be a false representation," and creditor relied on that representation and was induced into entering into the remodeling contract by it. Creditor paid $123,000 to debtor, who in turn paid out more than that to subcontractors. The state court awarded judgment against debtor exclusively for his violation of two state statutes.

The first provided that a person induced to contract with a building contractor "in reliance on false or fraudulent representation or false statements knowingly made" can be awarded a $500 penalty plus attorney fees, plus "any damages sustained by him by reason of such statements or representations made by the contractor." The court awarded creditor this $500 penalty plus $71,000 in attorney fees, but expressly found that the $123,000 paid by the creditor were NOT damages "sustained by him by reason of such statements or representations."

The second statute which the debtor was found to have violated allows a person contracting with an unlicensed contractor "to recover all compensation paid" to the contractor. This disgorgement statute is not limited to damages based on fraud.

On cross motions for summary judgment, the bankruptcy court held that the $123,000 "disgorgement" award was dischargeable but the $500 penalty and $71,000 in attorney fees were not. The creditor appealed; the debtor did not cross appeal as to the penalty or attorney fees, indeed did not even file a responsive brief in creditor's appeal.

Section 523(a)(2)(A)
This subsection exempts from discharge debts "to the extent obtained, by ... false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor's . . . financial condition." Under 9th Circuit precedent, the elements a creditor must show are the misrepresentation, debtor's knowledge of its falsity, debtor's intent to deceive, the creditor's justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation, and damage to the creditor "proximately caused" by his reliance on the misrepresentation.

The BAP's Analysis and Holding
The Court focused on the last of these elements, whether the $123,000 awarded by the state court were damages "proximately caused" by creditor's reliance on debtor's misrepresentation about being a licensed contractor; or in the language of the Supreme Court's opinion in Cohen v. De La Cruz, whether that award was money "obtained by" that misrepresentation. Applying a strict construction to exceptions to discharge, the BAP construed Cohen to state that damages "assessed on account of the fraud" are not dischargeable, but distinguished the case here in that the state court had specifically held that the $123,000 in damages were not based on debtor's misrepresentation about being licensed. Instead the judgment for the $123,000 was based on the disgorgement statute which "is neutral as to fraudulent intent and was enacted to deter unlicensed contractors from offering their services for pay."

Thus the BAP held:
Because the $123,000 disgorgement of compensation under [the state statute] did not arise or flow from Debtor’s fraudulent conduct, the bankruptcy court correctly held that section 523(a)(2)(A) did not apply to that debt.
Dissent

The dissenting judge believed that the Supreme Court's holding in Cohen mandated that the $123,000 award was nondischargeable. It objected to the majority opinion's strict construction of the discharge exception, stating that instead the Court "should decline to employ a general rule of construction in favor of the specific interpretation given the same statute [§ 523(a)(2)(A)] at issue in this appeal by Cohen." "Cohen admonishes that all financial liability stemming from a fraudulent act, whether it be compensatory, punitive or statutory, is excepted from discharge." "Here, the facts show that but for the debtor’s fraud, Creditor would have never hired nor paid him. Plainly, the debtor’s responsibility to disgorge payments to Creditor is directly traceable to his deception." The dissent did not specifically discuss whether or not the two statutes that the state court judgment had been based on provided for damages arising from debtor's misrepresentation.

Bottom Line
A state court judgment award, to the extent it is based on a statute which provides the creditor compensation not arising from debtor’s fraudulent conduct, is dischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(A), even though debtor may otherwise have knowingly and intentionally engaged in a fraudulent misrepresentation reasonably relied upon by creditor.


by: Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys

Tuesday, October 14, 2008

What Must I Know about the NEW Nat'l Guard & Reservists Debt Relief Act of 2008? (Passed by Congress, & Presented to the President on Oct. 9, 2008)



Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or perform any legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.


By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys, Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com



The National Guard and Reservists Debt Relief Act of 2008 passed the U.S. Senate by Unanimous Consent on September 30, 2008, and the House passed it with a roll call vote on October 3. The bill was presented on October 9 to the President to sign into law. Here is the Act as passed by Congress. I was not able to find any statements whether or not the President intends to sign it, but given the overwhelming Congressional support and the politically sensitive population assisted, I presume he will . The law primarily changes one subsection of the Bankruptcy Code, so it is easy to become familiar with it before its effective date.

The Population of Debtors Affected
The Act exempts a very specific population of debtors from the Section 707(b)(2)(A) means test, not allowing the dismissal or conversion of a case on that grounds of not meeting that test.

The debtors affected include those members of the National Guard and the Armed Forces Reserves who, after September 11, 2001:

1) at the time of filing their bankruptcy case either are in the midst of a period of at least 90 days of active duty, or had been in such a period of active duty during the last 540 days (about 18 months) before filing the case; or
2) at the time of filing their bankruptcy case are performing "a homeland defense activity" lasting at least 90 days, or had been in such a period during the last 540 days before filing the case.


GAO Study
Within two years after the effective date of the Act, the General Accountability Office must present to Congress "a study of the use and the effects of the provisions of law amended." The Congressional Research Service's summarizes the bounds of this study:
Directs the Comptroller General [the head of the GAO] to study and report to Congress on whether and to what degree members of reserve components of the Armed Forces and the National Guard: (1) avail themselves of the benefits of this Act; (2) are debtors in federal bankruptcy cases substantially related to service that qualifies such members for such benefits of this Act; and (3) are debtors in federal bankruptcy cases materially related to such service.
Requires such study to include the effects that the use by such members of this Act has upon: (1) the bankruptcy system; (2) creditors; and (3) the debt-incurrence practices of such members.
Effective Date of the Act
The Act will be effective 60 days after its date of enactment.

Temporary Nature of the Act
The Act will only be in effect for three years, for cases filed during the three-year period starting on the effective date of the Act.




by: Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys

Monday, October 13, 2008

Judge Brown: Future Debts Are Not Cross-Collateralized, at least not with these Contracts, & Antecedent Debts Aren't Either Unless Specified

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or perform any legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys, Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com



In re Matrix Development Corporation
Oregon Bankruptcy Court Case No. 08-32798
October 9, 2008
UNPUBLISHED

This unpublished letter opinion of last Thursday by Judge Trish Brown addresses the question whether the Chapter 11 corporate debtor's debts to a creditor bank were cross-collateralized. The debtor had entered into multiple promissory notes and trust deeds at different times with the bank, although each contained the same pertinent language, which included cross-collateralization clauses. Each trust deed also had language specifying the obligations secured by that trust deed. This letter opinion is an exercise in contractual interpretation, and to a large extent the judge's decisions turn on the contractual language particular to the case; indeed excerpts from the loan agreements and trust deeds took nearly two pages of the seven page letter.

But Judge Brown did make two rulings of more general application.

First as to the cross-collateralization of future obligations entered into after the trust deeds were recorded: Since a specific provision of a contract controls over an inconsistent general provision, where a series of trust deeds provided that all past, present, and future obligation of debtor were secured by each trust deed, but one clause stated to the contrary that a future obligation was secured by a trust deed only if the obligation specifically stated it was secured by that particular trust deed, since none of the subsequent obligations met that requirement they were not secured by any of the pre-existing trust deeds.

And second as to the cross-collateralization of prior, antecedent obligations: Although there was no specific provision to contradict the general provision granting that each trust deed secured pre-existing obligations, under Oregon law these obligations were still not secured by the trust deeds because of a Judge Radcliffe opinion, In re Wollin, 249 B.R. 555 (Bankr. D. Or. 2000), on such "dragnet" clauses, which stated that antecedent debt must be specified in the subsequent security instrument in order for the debt to be secured by it. The bank tried to distinguish this Wollin opinion as one involving a consumer loan in contrast to the commercial context at issue, but Judge Brown disagreed, stating that Judge Radcliffe's rational "is equally applicable in the commercial context." She also noted that all the loan agreements and trust deeds here were entered into after Wollin so
[a]s of the time the documents were executed, that under Oregon law antecedent debt would only be secured by an after acquired security interest if the documents evidencing the security interest specifically identified that antecedent debt. Despite that fact, the Bank chose not to identify any specific antecedent debt in any of the deeds of trust it obtained from the Debtor. Accordingly, none of the antecedent debt is secured by any of the deeds of trust.

by: Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys

Friday, October 10, 2008

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Bankruptcy Opinions of the Last 90 Days


By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys, Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com



Here are the last 90 days of bankruptcy opinions from the 9th Circuit, in reverse chronological order. Plus Maney v. Kagenveama since it was the "Most Important 9th Circuit Bankruptcy Opinion of the Summer." Click on the name of the opinion to link directly to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals website's original opinion, click on the "Title" to link to my prior published summary of the opinion from the Bulletin or Litigation Report sections of this website, if available. The "Key sentence" comes from my summary, with adjustments as appropriate, if available.


October 2, 2008
Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc.
9th Circuit Case No. 06-16421
NOTE: Opinion written by Chief Judge of the 9th Circuit, Alex Kozinski
Key sentence from my Bulletin: "Can a Chapter 13 debtor discharge a student loan by including it in the plan but without filing an adversary proceeding to determine debtor's undue hardship, if the student loan creditor fails to object to the plan? In this opinion filed by the 9th Circuit yesterday, its Chief Judge Kozinski emphatically answered: 'yes.' "
Title: Major New Student Loan Opinion: 9th Circuit Allows Chapter 13 Discharge of Student Loans WITHOUT Adversary Proceeding by Mere Inclusion in Plan


September 24, 2008
Rosson v. Fitzgerald (In re Rosson)
9th Circuit Case No. 06-35724
Key sentence from my Bulletin: "This brand-new Ninth Circuit opinion addresses the conflict between a Chapter 13 debtor's right to dismiss his case "at any time" and the bankruptcy court's power to convert the case to a Chapter 7 case "for cause" if it "is in the best interests of creditors and the estate," between § 1307(b) and § 1307(c) of the Bankruptcy Code."
Title: There's An Absolute Right for a Debtor to Dismiss a Chapter 13 Case, Right? NO, the 9th Circuit Said on 9/24/08


September 23, 2008
9th Circuit Case No. 06-56319
Key sentence from my Bulletin: Last week the 9th Circuit issued its 2nd opinion in as many months interpreting the "willful and malicious injury" language in § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code; it reversed both the bankruptcy court and the BAP, finding that neither court applied the 9th Circuit's law on § 523(a)(6) accurately."
Title: The 9th Circuit's Second § 523(a)(6) "Willful & Malicious Injury" Opinion in Two Months


September 4, 2008
Burkart v. Coleman (In re Tippett)
9th Circuit Case No 6.15411
Key sentence from my Bulletin: In this Opinion published last week the Ninth Circuit addressed one point of conflict between two very basic principles: the automatic stay and the bona fide purchaser, specifically the automatic stay's voiding of "any act to . . . exercise control over property of the estate" (§ 362(a)(3)), and the rights of a bona fide purchaser of such property of the estate. . . . In last Thursday's opinion the 9th Circuit said . . . a BFP prevails against a trustee.
Title: New 9th Circuit Opinion Adjusts the Line Between Void & Voidable Transfers in Violation of the Automatic Stay: Bona Fide Purchaser Defeats Trustee


August 22, 2008

Educational Credit Management Corp. v. Coleman
9th Circuit, Case # 06-16477
Key sentence in my Bulletin: The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a Chapter 13 debtor could get a judicial determination whether her student loans constituted an “undue hardship” and were thus dischargeable without waiting until close to or after the discharge at the end of the case. BUT CAUTION: This opinion was vacated by the Court because of an appellate procedural error, as explained in my Bulletin, likely to be corrected and returned to the 9th Circuit for final determination.
Title: 9th Circuit Holds that Ch. 13 "Undue Hardship" Student Loan Determinations Need NOT Wait Until End-of-Case Discharge


August 22, 2008
McDonald v. Checks-N-Advance, Inc. (In re Ferrell)
9th Circuit, Case No. 06-17243
Key sentence in my Bulletin: In this per curiam decision published on August 22, 2008, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that certain specific violations of the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA) do not result in the award of actual damages, statutory damages, or attorney fees and costs for the consumer, or specifically in this case for the Chapter 13 trustee acting on behalf of the consumer.
Title: 9th Circuit 8/22/08 Opinion: Ch. 13 Trustee NOT Entitled to Actual or Statutory Damages, Atty. Fees or Costs Under Portions of Truth in Lending Act


Auguts 21, 2008
Lowery v. Channel Communications, Inc. (In re Cellular 101, Inc.)
9th Circuit Case No. 06-55779
Quoted from the opinion: "The question posed by this case is whether a party’s failure to timely inform the court of appeals of a settlement that it believes disposes of a pending appeal precludes the party from asserting the affirmative defense of settlement and release in a later proceeding." The 9th Circuit answered "Yes;"
(No Bulletin or Litigation Report on this opinion.)


August 7, 2008
Lockerby v. Sierra (In re Sierra)
9th Circuit Case No. 06-15928
Key Sentence from my Litigation Report: "This is a quick study in what it takes for a breach of contract claim to be nondischargeable under the "willful and malicious injury" provision of § 523(a)(6), to determine what if anything this 9th Circuit Lockerby opinion added to the law on this issue in Oregon that wasn't already in Judge Perris' Home Instead Oregon bankruptcy court opinion, other than the weight of greater authority."
Title: When Is Intentional Breach of Contract Nondischargeable Under § 523(a)(6)?: 9th Circuit Proclaims Legal Standard for "Willful & Malicious Injury"


Amended August 7, 2008; originally filed July 3, 2008
GECC v. Future Media Productions Inc.
9th Circuit Case # 07-55694
Quoted from the opinion: "General Electric Capital Corporation (“GECC”), an oversecured creditor, appeals the bankruptcy court’s order denying it default interest and attorneys’ fees . . [on the grounds that the] bankruptcy court improperly applied a per se rule against default interest to the facts of this case. [W]e reverse and remand to the bankruptcy court with instructions to apply the rule adopted by the majority of federal courts and to then determine if an award of attorneys’ fees is proper."
(No Bulletin or Litigation Report on this opinion.)


June 23 , 2008
Maney v. Kagenveama
527 F.3d 990 (2008); LW 2278681
Key sentence in my Bulletin: The Ninth Circuit has applied a strict reading to BAPCPA's new terms, "projected disposable income" and "applicable commitment period," with the result that an above-median income debtor who had a negative income on Form B22C, and thus no "projected disposable income," had no requirement to pay unsecured creditors and no requirement to pay into the Chapter 13 plan for 5 years, or for any other particular period of time. However, under-median income debtors do not benefit from this ruling. How could all this be?
Title: The Most Important 9th Circ. B'cy Opinion of the Summer: Above-Median Income Ch. 13 Debtors Can Have 0%, Shorter-than 5-Year Plans




by: Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys


Wednesday, October 8, 2008

Ch. 13 Debtors with Fully Secured Vehicle Claim May Later Surrender Vehicle & Modify Plan to Treat Deficiency Balance as a General Unsecured Claim



By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys, Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com


In re Berendt
Oregon Bankruptcy Case No. 07-35054-elp13

September 22, 2008


The Holding
In an unpublished letter opinion Judge Perris held that if a Chapter 13 plan had treated a claim as fully secured, then "following post-confirmation surrender of [the] collateral, a Chapter 13 debtor may modify a plan to terminate payments on the secured claim and treat any deficiency as unsecured."

Interestingly, in so ruling she rejected the rationale of an 6th Circuit Court of Appeals opinion, In re Nolan, 232 F.3d 528 (6th Cir. 2000), apparently the only circuit court to have ruled on this issue, instead finding "particularly persuasive" an Indiana bankruptcy judge's opinion, Bank One, NA v. Leuellen, 322 B.R. 648 (S.D. Ind. 2005) This Bulletin summarizes her analysis, and gives the perspectives of the attorneys. Miles Monson of Anderson & Monson, P.C. represents the creditor, Clackamas Community Federal Credit Union; Matthew Casper of Oliveros & O'Brien, P.C. represents the debtors, Timothy & Kara Berendt.

Essential Facts
The Berendts filed a Chapter 13 case and the plan was confirmed with the Clackamas Community Federal Credit Union as a fully secured creditor being paid outside the plan. Because Kara Berendt was unable to find employment, the debtors surrendered the vehicle to the creditor, which was unable to sell it without a deficiency balance. The Berendts proposed a modified plan which treated the credit union as a general unsecured creditor. The credit union objected.


Judge Perris' Analysis
The judge started by acknowledging that the "cases are deeply split over whether § 1329 allows modification of a confirmed chapter 13 plan to account for the surrender and sale of collateral that leaves a deficiency, when the plan had treated the claim as fully secured." She cites Nolan as the primary opinion not allowing such modification and the above Leuellen opinion as her primary support to the contrary. She notes that treatises have also split on the issue, with Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice against permitting this kind of modification while Collier on Bankruptcy and Chapter 13 Bankruptcy by Judge Keith Lundin allowing it.

Without discussing or refuting the Nolan opinion's arguments she merely said she disagreed with it, and found Leuellen "particularly persuasive" but did not explicitly say what was persuasive about it. She explained her lack of detailed analysis with this: "In light of the extensive opinions that have been written on this subject, I will give only a brief explanation of why I reach that conclusion."

Her "brief explanation" is a statutory one:

1) § 1329(a)(1) allows modified plans to "increase or reduce the amount of payments on claims of a particular class provided for by the plan." So debtors are allowed to modify payments to a formerly secured claim down to $0.

2) The Code and Rules permit objections to claims at any time, and also permits, at any time, valuations of collateral to determine the extent to which a claim is secured.

3) § 1325(a)(5)(C) clearly permits surrender of collateral as one way to treat a secured claim in a plan, and this is incorporated by 1329(b)(1) into plan modifications.

4) Lastly she states that "§ 1323(c) "also specifically applies to post-confirmation modifications", and "contemplates that a secured creditor's rights can be changed under a modification." (This argument is an odd one and perhaps inaccurate: section 1323 is entitled "Modification of plan before confirmation" and, contrary to what she said, nothing in it seems to specifically apply to POST-confirmation modifications instead of PRE-modification ones. Titles may not be part of the actual statutory language, but I see nothing in the actual language that shows that the subsection "specifically applies" to post-confirmation modifications. )

Her holding is:
For these reasons, I conclude that there is no impediment to modification of a confirmed chapter 13 plan to reflect the surrender of collateral and its sale for less than the amount of the debt. This includes treating the claim as partially secured up to the value of the collateral and partially unsecured for the deficiency. I agree with the courts that hold that the creditor’s interests are protected at initial confirmation by the requirement of adequate protection and at modification by the bankruptcy court’s discretion to deny confirmation if the debtors have acted in other than good faith with regard to the collateral.
Judge Perris concluded by giving the creditor five days to ask for an evidentiary hearing in case it believed there were unresolved issues of fact that undercut her analysis of the legal issue.

The credit union subsequently decided not to ask for an evidentiary hearing, and an order has now been entered overruling its objection.

The Creditor's Attorney's Perspective
Miles Monson informed me yesterday that the credit union has decided not to appeal. On the merits, he believes that the Fifth Circuit Nolan opinion lays out the argument well, how it is fundamentally a question of who should carry the risk: should the debtor or the creditor carry the risks of the collateral's depreciation and diminution or total loss in value after the confirmed plan determines the collateral's value? He believes that Nolan makes a very good case why the debtors should bear these risks, and so should not be able to change the secured claim through a surrender and post-confirmation modification. Mr. Monson believes the statutory ambiguity means that the issue is heading for in a split in the Circuits and will eventually need to be decided by the Supreme Court, but acknowledges that would be many years away.

The Debtors' Attorney's Perspective
Matt Casper was not surprised that the credit union decided not to appeal given the small amount at issue and the fact that it has already spent $1,440 on repairing the vehicle while selling it for only $1,500. And he said he was not surprised that Judge Perris did not follow Nolan in spite of it being the only Circuit opinion on the issue, because there are a number of lower court opinions within the 9th Circuit criticizing Nolan, although Judge Perris did not refer in her letter opinion to them. As for the risk-carrying argument, he says, "The creditor is in no worse position now than before the filing of the petition, had the vehicle been surrendered then. Creditors always carry the risk that borrowers will at any time have to surrender the collateral and file a bankruptcy on the deficiency balance." He doesn't see why that should be different just because the borrower is in a Chapter 13 case and paying the creditor directly, outside the plan.

Mr. Casper noted that the trustee has also objected to the modified plan, apparently not wanting to pay the credit union's deficiency balance as an unsecured claim, thereby diluting distributions to the pool of allowed unsecured claims. The hearing on this objection is scheduled for October 15. If the result is interesting, I will report on it in a future Bulletin.

The Bottom Line
Even with an unpublished letter opinion, Judge Perris is certainly signaling her opinion on this issue. She presumably made a point of putting it on the bankruptcy court website so that practitioners would read it. The immediate question is whether the other four Oregon judges agree with her holding since they are not legally bound by it. I am guessing that as the senior judge she may be signaling to the others the direction that she believes this issue should go in the Oregon District, but on the other hand they may well be communicating about this more directly. Is this an issue appropriate for the next Circle of Love (Consumer Bankruptcy Committee of Debtor-Creditor Section) meeting? If anyone has more information about the other judges' treatment of this issue, please contact me and I'll include it an update.

by: Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys

Tuesday, October 7, 2008

What You and Your Clients Need to Know About Yesterday's $8 Billion Countrywide/Bank of America Settlement



By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys, Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com


What you need to know about yesterday's $8+ billion Countrywide settlement:

Oregon is NOT yet part of the 11-state settlement, but Washington and California are. Oregon may very well be part of the settlement soon. Also this settlement may well be a model for future similar agreement, so it is worth having a general understanding of it now. I will report on future developments about the situation in Oregon, perhaps within days.


What is this a settlement of? It is the largest ever predatory lending settlement in history. It resolves many but not all lawsuits filed by states' attorneys general, led by Illinois' Lisa Madigan and California's Jerry Brown, alleging that Countrywide Financial or one of its affiliates intentionally sold customers risky loans that it knew were unaffordable, using deceptive advertising and rewarding staff for promoting loans with higher rates and fees than customers qualified for. Some states' lawsuits were not included in this settlement and so continue, and other lawsuits by the states who settled continue against individual defendants, including Countrywide's CEO. Bank of America acquired Countrywide on July 1.

Who are eligible homeowners? Only those who entered into subprime and pay-option adjustable rate mortgages with first payments due between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2007, involving real estate occupied by the borrowers as their primary residence. The rationale is that these loans are the ones most at risk for default and foreclosure. The number of affected mortgages: about 400,000 within the 11 states in this settlement. To qualify the loans must be seriously delinquent or likely to become so because of upcoming interest rate or payment increases.

What are the terms of the agreement? It is a mandatory loan-modification program, containing a number of components. Some loans will be FHA refinanced through the HOPE for Homeowners Program. Countrywide will refinance other loans directly, reducing balances and/or interest rates, to as low as 2.5%, depending on the borrowers ability to pay, holding at that level for five years and then adjusting to the then-prevailing Fannie Mae fixed-rate interest rate. The new monthly payment amounts for principal, interest, insurance and taxes will be based on 34% of monthly income.

The majority of the cost of the settlement is for these loan modifications, but $79 million is dedicated for waivers of loan modification fees and $56 million for waivers of prepayment penalties. $150 million is for a foreclosure relief fund for those homeowners 4 months or more behind on their payments or whose mortgages have already foreclosed. Another $70 million fund will help borrowers who cannot refinance relocate to rental housing.


Timing?
The loan modification program is scheduled to be ready for implementation on December 1, 2008. Foreclosures are not to be started or continued for borrowers likely to qualify until the lender makes "an affirmative decision on borrower's eligibility."


Contacts:
There is a Countrywide borrowers' hotline for more information at 1-800-669-6607, and also at www.countrywide.com.



by: Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorney


Monday, October 6, 2008

Oregon's Economy Continues to Weaken, Says U. of Oregon Index of Economic Indicators (And That Was BEFORE the Events of the Last Few Weeks)

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or perform any legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys, Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com


The Oregon Economic Forum announced last week that the University of Oregon Index of Economic Indicators fell in August 2008 by 0.8% to 100.3 (100.0 = 1997 benchmark). That index is down from 102.4 six months earlier in February, down from 103.1 a year earlier in August 2007, and down from 106.8 & 106.2 two and three years earlier, in August 2006 and 2005, respectively.

This index had climbed steadily after May 2003, starting from a low then of about 98.1, and reached a peak of about 103.9 in the summer of 2006. The index plateaued at between 103 and 104 for an extended time, from about the winter of 2005-2006 to the fall of 2007, and has been falling generally since then, although with occasional month-to-month increases, including two of the eight months of 2008.


The index combines eight indicators:
Oregon Initial Unemployment Claims
Oregon Residential Building Permits
Oregon Help-Wanted Advertising
Oregon Weight Distance Tax
Oregon Total Non-farm Payrolls
Univ. of Michigan U.S. Consumer Confidence
Real Manufacturers’ New Orders for Non-defense Non-aircraft Capital Goods
Interest Rate Spread, 10-Year Treasury Bonds Less Federal Funds Rate (the difference between short-term and long-term interest rates)
Of these, in August only U.S. consumer confidence improved. Payrolls reduced by 7,400 employees. Initial unemployment claims rose while help-wanted advertising in Oregon newspapers declined. Residential building permits and orders for capital goods declined.


by: Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorney

Friday, October 3, 2008

Major New Student Loan Opinion: 9th Circuit Allows Chapter 13 Discharge of Student Loans WITHOUT Adversary Proceeding by Mere Inclusion in Plan



By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys, Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com


Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc.
9th Circuit No. 06-16421
Filed October 2, 2008
NOTE: Opinion written by Chief Judge of the 9th Circuit, Alex Kozinski

Can a Chapter 13 debtor discharge a student loan by including it in the plan but without filing an adversary proceeding to determine debtor's undue hardship, if the student loan creditor fails to object to the plan? In this opinion filed by the 9th Circuit yesterday, its Chief Judge Kozinski emphatically answered: "yes."

This is an amazing opinion. It is one of the most colorful opinions I've read in months (see some of that "color" quoted below). In overturning the District Court appellate decision and following its own 9th Circuit precedents, it strongly rejected constitutional arguments to the contrary by the 4th, 6th & 7th Circuits as well as statutory arguments to the contrary by the 2nd and 10th Circuits. (This 2007 10th Circuit opinion was an en banc decision--one decided by the full court of judges in the Circuit--which overturned one of its own 1999 opinions, this now overturned earlier 10th Circuit opinion having been previously used by the 9th Circuit in support of ITS own 1999 opinion, which in contrast Judge Kozinski here reaffirmed as good law!) This Espinosa opinion also explicitly overruled a trio of recent 9th Circuit BAP opinions, as well as some published bankruptcy court opinions within the Circuit.

Special Plan Language

The Chapter 13 plan in this case contained some critical and exceptionally specific language:
One section of the plan is titled "Educational Loan(s)" and lists all of [the student loan creditor's] loans, for a total of $13,250. The plan specifies that this amount should be paid in full, followed by a paragraph stating as follow:
The amounts claimed by [the student loan creditors] for capitalized interest, penalties, and fees shall not be paid for the reasons that the same are penalties and not provided for in the loan agreement between the Debtor and the lender.
The subsequent paragraph provides as follows:
Any amounts or claims for student loans unpaid by this Plan shall be discharged.
Statutory Argument

§ 1328(a)(2) of the Code lists some of the debts which are excluded from a Chapter 13 discharge, including "debts . . . of the kind specified in paragraph . . . (8) . . . of section 523(a) . . . ." § 523(a)(8) contains the familiar language about excepting debts from discharge for " an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit . . . ", unless excepting such a debt from discharge "would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents . . . ." So if the Chapter 13 discharge does not discharge a student loan unless that loan imposes an undue hardship on the debtor, and there is no determination of that undue hardship in an adversary proceeding, how can this student loan be deemed discharged merely by creditor not objecting to the plan?


Indeed the student loan creditor's statutory argument was that the bankruptcy court should set aside the discharge order entered at the end of the Chapter 13 case because the debtor did not file such an adversary proceeding to determine undue hardship. Judge Kozinski's quick response was to cite 9th Circuit precedent: "Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. v. Pardee (In re Pardee), 193 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999), which is on all fours with our case, forecloses this argument." "In essence, Pardee held that a discharge is a final judgment and cannot be set aside or ignored because a party suddenly claims, years later, that the trial court committed an error."

Espinosa rejects the recent arguments of the 2nd and 10th Circuits which found conflict between § 1327(a), the Chapter 13 plan confirmation "finality provision," and the Code sections and Rules calling for an adversary proceeding to discharge student loans. "We see no such conflict; both provisions can operate fully, within their proper spheres." If a debtor proposes a plan which includes a discharge or partial discharge of a student loan and does not file an adversary proceeding to establish undue hardship, the creditor can object to the plan.
But there are many reasons a student loan creditor might not object to such a Chapter 13 plan. The creditor might, for example, believe that the debtor would be able to make a convincing showing of undue hardship, and thus see no point in wasting the debtor’s money, and its own, litigating the issue. Or, the creditor may decide that a Chapter 13 plan presents its best chance of collecting most of the debt, rather than spending years trying to squeeze blood out of a turnip. Or, the creditor may hope that the debtor will make some payments on the plan but ultimately fail to complete it, in which case the creditor will have collected a portion of the debt and still be free to collect the rest later. [Footnote pointing out that statistically about 2/3rds of Chapter 13 cases fail.] Or, the creditor may overlook the notice or fail to understand its legal implications. Regardless, when the creditor is served with notice of the proposed plan, it has a full and fair opportunity to insist on the special procedures available to student loan creditors by objecting to the plan on the ground that there has been no undue hardship finding. Rights may, of course, be waived or forfeited, if not raised in a timely fashion. This doesn’t mean that these rights are ignored, or that a judgment that is entered after a party fails to assert them conflicts with the statutory scheme or is somehow invalid.

The opinion then makes clear that a bankruptcy discharge order is a final judgment, which "cannot be ignored or set aside just because it was the result of an error." After the discharge order is entered and not appealed from, it, like any judgment, can be reconsidered only under the very limited circumstances (such as mistake, excusable neglect, fraud) permitted under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

This Espinosa opinion rejected the 2nd and 10th Circuits' res judicata argument, that the order confirming a plan should not be given preclusive effect and the student loan discharged with the discharge order because undue hardship was not adjudicated on the merits at the time of confirmation. Judge Kozinski retorted that
the creditor in our case (as in those other cases) did get proper notice of the proposed Chapter 13 plan, and so knew perfectly well that if the plan were approved and satisfied, the debtor would be granted a discharge of the student debt listed in the plan. Had the creditor wanted to insist on an adversary, it could have objected to the Chapter 13 plan on the ground that there was no judicial finding of undue hardship. . . . . But [the creditor] didn’t object to the plan and didn’t appeal the order confirming the plan, as it well could have. Instead, it accepted the payments made by the debtor during the plan’s life and then acted as if the whole thing never happened.

It makes a mockery of the English language and common sense to say that Funds wasn’t given notice, or was somehow ambushed or taken advantage of. The only thing the creditor was not told is that it could insist on an adversary proceeding and a judicial determination of undue hardship. But that’s less a matter of notice and more of a tutorial as to what rights the creditor has under the Bankruptcy Code—a long-form Miranda warning for bankers. If that were the standard for adequate notice, every notification under the Bankruptcy Code would have to be accompanied by Collier’s Treatise, lest the creditor overlook some rights it might have under the Code.
. . . .
After all, we aren’t talking here about destitute widows and orphans, or people who don’t speak English or can’t afford a lawyer. The creditors in such cases are huge enterprises whose business it is to administer the very kinds of debts here in question. If this kind of notice to sophisticated parties who have ample resources to protect their rights is inadequate for purposes of res judicata, then the concept of notice has no meaning and res judicata is a fairy tale. [Citations omitted.]
Constitutional Argument

The student loan creditor argued that it was denied due process as to the discharge order because it was not served with a summons and complaint for determination of undue hardship as is required by Rule 7004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. The 9th Circuit acknowledged that within the last few years three different Circuits have been persuaded by that argument, but found
the due process argument even less persuasive than the statutory argument, despite the eagerness of some of our sister circuits and other courts to adopt it. What appears to be going on is that courts are re-casting what may be a simple statutory violation as a denial of due process so that they can set aside judgments with which they’re unhappy. This approach is not consistent with the theory of objective judging, which calls for us to apply the law fairly to the facts and let the chips fall where they may.
The Judge Kozinski continued to focus on the order confirming plan as a final judgment, and looked at what would be constitutionally inadequate notice to a student loan creditor, one in violation of due process. He cited the familiar U. S. Supreme Court opinion of Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) for the standard of constitutionally adequate notice: “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objection.”

The Court noted that the student loan creditor here had received actual notice, been "warned [in the notice] of the consequences of failing to object--which is more than due process requires," had filed a proof of claim, and had failed to object to the treatment laid out clearly in the plan.
We cannot say that [the student loan creditor] was taken by surprise or was denied due process. Quite the contrary: ]the creditor] appears to have been a willing participant, perfectly happy to receive the benefits of the Chapter 13 plan, but unwilling to suffer the consequences of its failure to file an objection.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument of its "sister circuits" that where the Code and Rules require a greater degree of notice through an adversary procedure, "due process entitles a party to receive such notice before an order binding the party will be afforded preclusive effect," quoting the 4th Circuit opinion. To the contrary Judge Kozinski said
we find it both wrong and dangerous to hold that the standard for what amounts to constitutionally adequate notice can be changed by legislation. The constitutional standard, as we understand it, requires that a party affected by the litigation obtain sufficient notice so that it is able to take steps to defend its interests. Congress can, of course, give rights to additional notice, but we find it difficult to see how this can affect the floor provided by due process—either to increase or diminish it.
Beside, the Court said that Congress did not try to change the constitutional standard here: it "made it quite clear that a creditor need only get ordinary notice of a Chapter 13 plan to be bound by its terms. That Congress provided heightened notice requirements for an adversary proceeding, which didn’t take place here, is of no consequence."

Not Need En Banc Review

The coup de grace of Judge Kozinski's opinion was his repeated assertions that his three-judge panel did NOT need to call for an en banc rehearing in spite of conflicts with so many other Circuits, as well as with a number of decisions in the 9th Circuit BAP and 9th Circuit bankruptcy courts. Why?: He simply did not find those other cases persuasive.
[W]e have taken a close look at the contrary holdings of our sister circuits in order to determine whether we have strayed off course, in which case we would call for rehearing en banc to correct our caselaw. But we don’t find the reasoning of the two other circuits persuasive. Seeing no reason to change course, we continue to follow [9th Circuit precedent] Pardee.
. . . .
We do not find this [due process] reasoning [by the 4th, 6th & 7th Circuits] persuasive and thus have no occasion to call for rehearing en banc to consider overruling [9th Circuit precedent] In re Gregory.
I can't help but muse whether he had other reason for not asking for en banc review: Did he perhaps harbor some fear that the en banc 9th Circuit would not stand by him, or he did not want to tempt such challenge to his "authority" as chief judge among his brother and sister judges? Note that his opinion barely cites any authority outside the Ninth Circuit, other than a 58-year old Supreme Court decision. And he is pushing a rationale based in large part on a 10th Circuit case that was repudiated last year by an en banc decision of the 10th Circuit. Principled and gutsy, or stubborn and erroneous, in any event it's an entertaining opinion.


by: Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorney

Thursday, October 2, 2008

Three New Unpublished Judge Alley Opinions: Dismissal of Malicious Prosecution, Trustee Appointment in Ch. 11, BAPCPA Tr. Fees Applied Retroactively



By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys, Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com


These three unpublished opinions by Judge Frank Alley are all dated September 15, 2008, although they hit the court's website a few days after that. The case names are linked to the opinions on the court website for quick access to the full opinions.

Miller v. McDougal Bros. Investments
Adv. Pro. No. 08-6110-fra

In this rather factually detailed adversary proceeding (for a 6-page letter opinion at least), Judge Alley granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice and without a hearing. Plaintiff was a Chapter 7 debtor. Defendants were a) a lessor/seller of real property to debtor, b) a subsequent purchaser of that property at a foreclosure sale, c) an attorney for that purchaser who represented that purchaser in a suit to eject the debtor from the property, and d) the attorney who defended the purchaser's attorney in a bar complaint by debtor against that purchaser's attorney, and also represented the purchaser in a lawsuit by debtor against the purchaser. The judge held as follows:

1) The debtor-plaintiff failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution or fraud and misrepresentation against the two attorneys for informing the Chapter 7 trustee of plaintiff's possible interest in the real property at the time of filing, although by that time he had been legally ejected from the property. Plaintiff had failed to list this possible interest in the property in his bankruptcy schedules, it was not deemed abandoned to the plaintiff in his role as a debtor and so continued to remain property of the estate subject to the trustee's administration and also subject to the automatic stay. The attorneys violated no duty to plaintiff in informing the Chapter 7 trustee about this possible property interest; indeed it indirectly led to the US Trustee moving to reopening the Chapter 7 case and the trustee realizing some funds for the estate from which to pay creditors. In addition, the attorneys acted within the scope of their attorney-client relationship so they were "within their qualified privilege against liability in tort for actions taken on behalf of a client."

2) Judge Alley held that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to review a state court order dismissing plaintiff's complaint against the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, because "it would constitute an invalid collateral attack on that court's final order." Plaintiff's state court case had been dismissed because he did not have standing, the real estate at issue being still vested in the bankruptcy estate.

3) Similarly, the judge held that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to review the Oregon Court of Appeal's dismissal of plaintiff's appeal of the ejectment judgment, that plaintiff should have address his concerns about that proceeding with that court. And the attorney for the purchaser at foreclosure did not violate any bankruptcy order when he filed a motion to dismiss that appeal on behalf of the purchaser.


In re South Star Oil Co.
Case No. 08-61072-fra11

On motion of the US Trustee and several creditors to dismiss or convert this chapter 11 case to chapter 7, or to appoint a trustee, Judge Alley determined that a trustee should be appointed pursuant to § 1104 of the Code.

1) Under § 503(b)(9) administrative expenses include "the value of any goods received by the debtor within 20 days before the date of commencement of a case under this title in which the goods have been sold to the debtor in the ordinary course of such debtor's business." Administrative expenses must be paid in full on the effective date of the plan, unless the holder of the claim agrees to the contrary, pursuant to § 1129(a)(9)(A). The debtor-in-possession (DIP) is the operator of ten gasoline service stations. During the 20-day pre-petition period, about $1.3 million in product was supplied by one gasoline supplier, leaving an administrative expense of between $512,000 and $1.3 million depending on some accounting issues involving a large payment made during that same period. Given the supplier's unwillingness to be delay payment in full, and the DIP's lack of cash or any marketable equity in its assets, the judge determined it unlikely that the DIP could propose and confirm a plan. Thus there was cause to convert or dismiss the case because this constituted "the absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation" under § 1112(a)(4).

2) Judge Alley concluded as follow, applying § 1104(a), and particularly (although not stating so) § 1104(a)(3) added by BAPCPA and explicitly allowing the appointment of a trustee whenever grounds exist for conversion or dismissal, if it "is in the best interests of creditors and the estate" :
Where cause for dismissal is established, the Court may, in the alternative, appoint a trustee or an examiner if it appears to be in the best interest of the creditors to do so. At first blush, a dismissal of the case appears to be the most likely remedy. However, dismissal would severely prejudice [the supplier's administrative] claim, since it would not have administrative priority in any subsequently filed case. Conversion to Chapter 7, while it would provide for a speedy liquidation of the debtor’s assets, and payment of most of the secured debt, would not allow the estate to avail itself of any value these properties have while they support ongoing businesses. It follows that the best resolution to a difficult situation is the appointment of a trustee under Code § 1104.


In re Owens
Case No. 05-70329-fra7

1) The court's primary ruling was to retroactively apply one of BAPCPA's changes to a Chapter 7 case filed a few days BEFORE BAPCPA's effective date, on the justification that "[w]hen a statutory amendment acts to clarify an existing provision rather than to make substantive changes to it, the amendment is normally applied retroactively." The provision added by BAPCPA was a new §330(a)(7) of the Code, stating:
In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded to a trustee, the court shall treat such compensation as a commission, based on § 326.
§ 326 in turn lays out the maximums that Chapter 7 (and Chapter 11) trustees may be compensated, the familiar "not to exceed 25 percent on the first $5,000 or less, 10 percent on any amount in excess of $5,000 but not in excess of $50,000 . . . ." Judge Alley interpreted the new §330(a)(7)'s requirement that trustee compensation be treated "as a commission" as doing "no more than to clarify Congress' understanding of §326."


2) Beyond applying BAPCPA's §330(a)(7) retroactively, Judge Alley's interpreted how this addition interplays with §326. His interpretation indicates a significant change in the method for trustee fee calculation, at least in certain cases. Judge Alley stated that before BAPCPA a trustee's commission was "determined by multiplying the amount of time spent by the trustee by a reasonable hourly rate; thus, the limits set out in §326 are a ceiling, and no more." But now "[r]eading §§ 326 and 330 together, the statutory scheme provides that a trustee is presumed to be entitled to compensation in the amount specified in §326," although that "presumptive commission . . . must be adjusted to the extent necessary to ensure that the commission actually paid is reasonable." The commission is "subject to reduction if the maximum amount is substantially disproportionate to the value of the trustee's services to the estate" or "if errors or omissions on the part of the trustee result in a material loss to the estate or unsecured creditors."

3) The error by the trustee in this case was to sell debtor's real property with a net loss to the estate after paying liens against the property and the realtor's and trustee's commissions, because the trustee had not realized that one of the secured creditors was entitled to a $8,000 prepayment penalty. Judge Alley noted that the trustee's fee could be reduced to whatever the fee would have been had the real estate been abandoned, but here " the result would be draconian." Instead the judge reduced the trustee's fee by $2,430, the amount "necessary to restore to unsecured creditors the amount lost as a result of the sale."

by: Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorney