Friday, October 31, 2008

Eighth Circuit Declines to Follow Ninth Circuit's Kagenveama Opinion, Determines that Above-Median Income Ch. 13 Debtor Must Pay Plan for Full 5 Years


By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys, Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com



Coop v. Frederickson (In re Frederickson)
8th Circuit Court of Appeals, Case No. 07-3391

Decided 10/27/08

Although this Bulletin usually does not venture much outside the 9th Circuit for opinions to highlight, this 8th Circuit Frederickson opinion warrants an exception because its holding is so directly opposed to the very important Kagenveama opinion decided by the 9th Circuit this last June, thus setting up an eventual BANCPA-settling showdown at the U.S. Supreme Court.

In an earlier Bulletin in this website on Kagenveama, I called that opinion The Most Important 9th Circuit B'cy Opinion of the Summer. In that opinion the Ninth Circuit applied a strict reading to BAPCPA's new terms, "projected disposable income" and "applicable commitment period," with the result that an above-median income debtor who had a negative income on Form B22C, and thus no "projected disposable income," had no requirement to pay unsecured creditors and no requirement to pay into the Chapter 13 plan for 5 years, or for any other particular length of time.

In contrast, here in Frederickson the 8th Circuit ruled that for an above-median income chapter 13 debtor whose Form B22C disposable income was nevertheless negative, the debtor was required to propose either a full payment plan, or a sixty month plan which paid creditors claims at least in part. In so ruling it overturned both the bankruptcy court and the BAP. Interestingly, the BAP opinion which Frederickson directly overturned (Coop v. Frederickson (In re Frederickson), 375 B.R. 829 (B.A.P. 8th Cir 2007)) is one that the 9th Circuit in Kagenveama had cited favorably.

The 8th Circuit gets to the opposite conclusion than Kagenveama by starting with the opposite first step: asserting that BAPCPA's new terms, "projected disposable income" and "applicable commitment period," cannot be enforced as plain language because the "text leads to a result that is seemingly at odds with the congressional intent of the text." So instead of just enforcing the plain language of the statute, "in determining the true congressional intent of a statute it can be appropriate to consider all available evidence of that intent rather than limiting analysis to the text of the statute." From this consideration of "all available evidence of that intent" the 8th Circuit perceived that congressional intent was "to eliminate what it perceived as widespread abuse of the system by curtailing the bankruptcy courts’ discretion and requiring debtors to pay more to their unsecured creditors."

The Court also asserted that the statute was simply not clear, that there were different "possible interpretations of the text that are supported by authority," as evidenced by the opposing positions of the Chapter 13 debtor and the trustee in this very dispute, and by "the differing outcomes of the bankruptcy courts that have examined this issue to date."


Then after acknowledging that Congress clearly and rigidly defined "disposable income" in § 1325(b)(2) but did not define “projected disposable income” as used in § 1325(b)(1)(B), the Court asserted that if "a distinction [is] drawn between a debtor’s 'disposable income,'
which is calculated solely on the basis of historical numbers and regional averages, and a debtor’s 'projected disposable income,' which necessarily contemplates a forward-looking number," then bankruptcy courts will continue to have some discretion over the calculations of each individual debtor’s financial situation, with the result that the debtor’s 'projected disposable income' will end up more closely aligning with reality. "

The Court seems to go so far as to explicitly rewrite the statute: "If we read the word 'projected' out of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) and rely solely on the calculation of 'disposable income' on Form 22C, the
outcome involves anomalous, and perhaps even absurd, results."
Accordingly, we adopt the view shared by many bankruptcy courts that a debtor’s “disposable income” calculation on Form 22C is a starting point for determining the debtor’s “projected disposable income,” but that the final calculation can take into consideration changes that have occurred in the debtor’s financial circumstances as well as the debtor’s actual income and expenses as reported on Schedules I and J. . . . . Additionally, under this interpretation, the 'applicable commitment period' is logically a temporal requirement that does not lead to anomalous or absurd results. . . . . Thus, we conclude that the bankruptcy court erred by confirming [debtor's] plan because [debtor] actually does have projected disposable income and therefore the plan cannot be confirmed over the trustee’s objection unless it extends for the entire sixty-month applicable commitment period.
The 8th Circuit ended with direct rejection of Kagenveama:
In arriving at our holding, we have given careful consideration to the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in In re Kagenveama, 541 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2008), which found persuasive the Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s decision in this case. With all due respect to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, we believe that the approach we have taken will more fully accomplish that which Congress intended to achieve through the enactment of BAPCPA.
Stay tuned as to whether the debtor here appeals this case to the Supreme Court. Note that the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (NACBA) had filed an amicus brief on behalf of the debtor, and therefor may well be willing to give continued assistance to bring this contentious issue to national resolution. Until then, Kagenveama is the law of the Ninth Circuit, with opposite law in the Eighth.


by: Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys


Thursday, October 30, 2008

Local Credit Card Default Rates Increasing



Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or perform any legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.


By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys, Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com




The following information is made available through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, based on data from TransUnion LLC's Trend Data:

1) Credit card delinquency rate, showing the percentage of accounts that are late 60 or more days:


Oregon Counties

Clackamas 1.46%

Clatsop 1.38%

Columbia 2.00%

Deschutes 1.67%

Douglas 1.88%

Hood River 1.21%

Jefferson 2.70%

Josephine 1.42%

Klamath 1.70%

Lane 1.64%

Marion 2.01%

Multnomah 1.66%

Polk 1.51%
Tillamook 1.95%

Washington 1.54%
Yamhill 1.76%


Washington Counties

Clark 1.57%
Cowlitz 1.69%

Pacific 0.70%
Skamania 0.98%


2) Change in credit card delinquency rate, showing the percentage point difference in 60+ day delinquent accounts from 4 quarters earlier:

Oregon Counties

Clackamas + .29%

Clatsop + .09%

Columbia + .64%

Deschutes + .47%
Douglas
+ .46%
Hood River + .61%

Jefferson +1.40%

Josephine - .05%

Klamath + .38%

Lane + .31%

Marion + .29%

Multnomah + .22%
Polk 0.00%

Tillamook + .32%

Washington + .28%

Yamhill +1.45%


Washington Counties
Clark + .40%
Cowlitz + .54%

Pacific - .79%

Skamania - .48%



Source: Above data reflects end of quarter, 1st Q 2008, made available by Federal Reserve Bank of New York, from TransUnion LLC's Trend Data.


by: Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys

Wednesday, October 29, 2008

The Supreme Court's Limits on the Right of Chapter 7 Debtors to Convert to Chapter 13



Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or perform any legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.


By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys, Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com





by: Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys

Tuesday, October 28, 2008

The Now-Limited Rights to Convert from Chapter 7 to 13 & from Chapter 13 to 7: the U.S. Supreme Court's Marrama and the 9th Circuit's Rosson Opinions

Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts
127 S.Ct. 1105
Decided February 21, 2007



In a Bulletin on this website in September entitled There's An Absolute Right for a Debtor to Dismiss a Chapter 13 Case, Right? NO, the Ninth Circuit Said on 9/24/08, I summarized the Ninth Circuit opinion
Rosson v. Fitzgerald (In re Rosson),---- F. 3d ----, 2008 WL 4330558 (9th Cir 2008), which addressed conversion of a Chapter 13 case to a Chapter 7 one. In that opinion the Ninth Circuit expressly overturned a long-standing Ninth Circuit BAP opinion, based on the authority of the 2007 U.S. Supreme Court Marrama opinion cited above. Marrama dealt with conversion of a Chapter 7 case to Chapter 13, while Rosson dealt with conversion from Chapter 13 to 7. Because of its differences from and broader application than Rosson, and simply because it is one of the relatively rare Supreme Court bankruptcy opinions, Marrama is definitely worth knowing well.

Supreme Court Holding
Marrama involved the right of a debtor to convert a Chapter 7 case to Chapter 13 under § 706(a). The Supreme Court held "that the right to convert to Chapter 13 was impliedly limited by the bankruptcy court’s power to take any action necessary to prevent bad-faith conduct or abuse of the bankruptcy process."

Statute

conflict between a Chapter 13 debtor's right to dismiss his case "at any time" and the bankruptcy court's power to convert the case to a Chapter 7 case "for cause" if it "is in the best interests of creditors and the estate," between § 1307(b) and § 1307(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. This Ninth Circuit Rosson opinion is very important because: 1) this specific question is one of first impression in this Circuit, 2) there is a conflict among other Circuits, 3) this opinion expressly overturned a long-standing Ninth Circuit BAP opinion, 4) the Court let stand the conversion in spite of the bankruptcy court's failure to provide the debtor the required notice and hearing on the matter, and 5) the Opinion provides a vague standard for determining when debtor's have a right to dismiss, but its very vagueness demands that it be understood in order to counsel clients on this issue.

The debtor in Rosson based his argument for the absolute right to dismiss on the well-known 9th Circuit BAP opinion, Beatty v. Traub (In re Beatty), 162 B.R. 853 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994), which had clearly held that "[t]he better reasoned view is that a court must dismiss the case upon the debtor's request for dismissal under section 1307(b) if that request is made prior to the [formal] order converting the case to Chapter 7."

The Ninth Circuit's justification for overturning Beatty is a 2007 U.S. Supreme Court opinion, Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. 1105, although that opinion involved the right of a debtor to convert a Chapter 7 case to Chapter 13 under § 706(a). The Supreme Court held "that the right to convert to Chapter 13 was impliedly limited by the bankruptcy court’s power to take any action necessary to prevent bad-faith conduct or abuse of the bankruptcy process."

But the Ninth Circuit in Rosson glossed over (in a brief footnote) the differences in language between § 1307(b) at issue in Rosson, and § 706(a) at issue in Marrama, especially § 1307(b)'s use of the mandatory "shall" (as in "[u]pon request of the debtor . . . the court shall dismiss a case under [Chapter 13]") and § 706(a)'s use of the permissive "may." The Rosson Court simply said that "[h]ere, the different formulations are not dispositive," without saying why not. This Court ironically hinges its rationale that these two different provisions are analogous on a 9th Circuit BAP opinion, Croston v. Davis (In re Croston), 313 B.R. 447, 450 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004), which came after Beatty and which had EXTENDED the Beatty absolute right to dismiss a Chapter 13 under § 1307(b) to an absolute right to convert to Chapter 13 under § 706(a). In Rosson the Ninth Circuit reasoned that since Marrama had directly overturned Croston, and Croston had relied on Beatty, Marrama had logically invalidated Beatty as well. It held that "although Marrama did not address the exact issue decided in Beatty, it is clear that, after Marrama, Beatty . . . is no longer good law, insofar as it held that a Chapter 13 debtor has an absolute right to dismiss under § 1307(b)."

UPDATES: Bush Signs Nat'l Guard & Reservists Debt Relief Act; 2 Debtors' Attorney "Gag Rule" Cases on Appeal to Circ. Cts, Olsen & State Bar of Conn.



Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or perform any legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.


By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys, Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com


On October 20, President Bush signed into law the National Guard and Reservists Debt Relief Act of 2008. Here is the text of the Act. It is effective 60 days after its enactment, thus on December 19, 2008, and is in effect for cases filed during the 3 years following that date, and then expires.

The Act primarily changes one subsection of the Bankruptcy Code, exempting a very specific population of debtors from the Section 707(b)(2)(A) means test. It also requires the General Accountability Office (GAO) to present to Congress within two years "a study of the use and the effects of the provisions of law amended.," including "the effects that the use by such members of this Act has upon: (1) the bankruptcy system; (2) creditors; and (3) the debt-incurrence practices of such members."

Debtors' attorneys' questionnaires, written and oral, should immediately be changed to select out those members of the National Guard and the Armed Forces Reserves who, after September 11, 2001:
1) at the time of filing their bankruptcy case either are in the midst of a period of at least 90 days of active duty, or had been in such a period of active duty during the last 540 days (about 18 months) before filing the case; or
2) at the time of filing their bankruptcy case are performing "a homeland defense activity" lasting at least 90 days, or had been in such a period during the last 540 days before filing the case.


****************************************************************
Two cases about the constitutionality of BAPCPA's prohibition against attorneys advising clients to incur additional debt: both the 2006 Oregon U.S. District Court opinion Olsen v. Gonzales (now Mukasey), and the September 2008 Connecticut U.S. District Court opinion Connecticut Bar Assn. v U.S., are on appeal, to the Ninth and the Second Circuit Court of Appeal, respectively. Please see these prior Bulletins which referred to the Olsen opinion
(in a Bulletin also about the only Circuit Court opinion on the issue, the Eighth Circuit's
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz v. United States); and to the State Bar of Connecticut one. Please also see future Bulletins for these two Court of Appeals opinions when they are decided.



by: Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys

Monday, October 27, 2008

When Stay Expires at End of 30 Days Because of Prior Dismissed B'cy Case, It Expires Just for Property of Debtor or Also for Property of the Estate?


Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or perform any legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.


By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys, Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com


In re Graham
Oregon Bankruptcy Court Case No. 07-62339-fra11

10/17/08 UNPUBLISHED


The Two Issues and the Two Holdings


1) Does an order terminating the automatic stay under BAPCPA's § 362(c)(3)(A), terminate the stay as to only property of the debtor or also as to property of the estate? Held: the stay terminates only as to property of the debtor, NOT property of the estate.

2) Is such a termination of the stay limited only to formal actions (judicial, administrative and other such formal actions) taken before the filing of the case, or is the stay terminated more broadly? Held: § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay only with regard to a formal action taken by a party before the filing of the case.

The Statute

Section 362(c)(3) provides in relevant part:
(3) if a single or joint case is filed by or against debtor who is an individual in a case under chapter 7, 11, or 13, and if a single or joint case of the debtor was pending within the preceding 1-year period but was dismissed. . . --
(A) the stay under subsection (a) with respect to any action taken with respect to a debt or property securing such debt or with respect to any lease shall terminate with respect to the debtor on the 30th day after the filing of the later case; [and]
(B) on the motion of a party in interest for continuation of the automatic stay and upon notice and a hearing, the court may extend the stay in particular cases as to any or all creditors (subject to such conditions or limitations as the court may impose) after notice and a hearing completed before the expiration of the 30-day period only if the party in interest demonstrates that the filing of the later case is in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed . . . . [Emphasis added].

The Procedural Context

This personal Chapter 11 case was filed within a month after the debtor's dismissed his Chapter 13 case, which he had dismissed in response to a creditor filing an objection alleging that debtor was not qualified for Chapter 13. In the Chapter 11 case debtor filed a timely motion to extend the stay beyond the initial 30 days, as required by § 362(c)(3)(B) quoted above, which the bankruptcy court denied from the bench, apparently without a written order to that effect. A secured creditor subsequently filed a motion asking for a determination that the stay was terminated not just as to property of the debtor but also property of the estate. This distinction was critical because upon the filing of the Chapter 11 case debtor's property securing the creditor's loans became property of the estate.

Judge Alley's Analysis

1) As to whether the stay had been terminated as to the property of the estate, the judge declined to take the "minority position" that the statute is ambiguous and that other BAPCPA provisions and "the broader context" show that the stay expired entirely. Instead he chose "to adopt the position of the majority of courts . . . which holds that there is no ambiguity in the statute, and that § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the stay with respect to the debtor and property of the debtor, but not property of the estate."

2) As to the meaning of the termination of the stay "with respect to any action taken," Judge Alley simply followed the "well reasoned" statutory analysis of a North Carolina bankruptcy court (In re Paschal, 337 B.R. 274 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006)) to define "action" in this subsection to mean a “formal action, such as a judicial, administrative, governmental, quasi-judicial, or other essentially formal activity or proceeding.” Furthermore, Pascal held that "action taken" means such formal action taken pre-petition. Thus, the only stay that was terminated was as to formal action taken by the creditor pre-petition. Since the secured creditor did not have any formal action pending pre-petition, the 30-day stay termination did not apply to it or to any future action it were to take. Instead it would have to file a conventional motion for relief from stay under § 362(d).

by Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys

Friday, October 24, 2008

The Best of the Bulletins: Highlights of Recent Stories on the Economy, Legislation, Housing Prices, & the Effects of BAPCPA


Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or perform any legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.


By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys, Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com


Here is a handy list of the titles of recent Bulletins from this website on issues of direct relevance to bankruptcy and debtor-creditor attorneys. Just click on the title to link to that story. I have two kinds of daily "Practice-Critical Bankruptcy Bulletins" on this website: 1) summaries of court opinions--mostly from the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the 9th Circuit, and the Oregon U.S. District Court and Bankruptcy Court, with occasional forays elsewhere; and 2) stories about the local and national economy, legislation, bankruptcy statistics and anything else of interest to professionals in this field. The following list is from this second category of Bulletins. A short excerpt follows each title. Please feel free to comment on any story--just click on the blue word "COMMENTS" immediately after the body of that Bulletin. I respond to all comments.


The Hope for Homeowners Program Launched on Oct. 1, 2008: What Do I Need to Know About It?
Excerpt: "In the rush of events on the national financial scene of the last few weeks and months it is difficult for a bankruptcy practitioner to to keep straight the various governmental interventions much less understand their consequences on her clients and on her practice. This Bulletin shines some light on one of the initial major events--The Housing and Economic Recovery Act signed into law on July 30, 2008-- and critical aspects of its Hope for Homeowners Program, which has now been in effect since October 1."
Posted: October 22, 2008


What Post-Bankruptcy Credit Solicitations Reveal About the Creditor Industry's Public Policy Arguments
Excerpt: "A recent law review article, Bankrupt Profits: The Credit Industry’s Business Model for Postbankruptcy Lending, "examines what the credit industry’s behavior toward recently bankrupt families reveals about its internal profit models and the likely causes of consumer bankruptcy." This article looks at the contentious issue of what causes debtors to file bankruptcy by analyzing "original empirical data from the first-ever detailed longitudinal study of bankrupt families," the Consumer Bankruptcy Project. The phase of the study pertinent to this article involved a dozen interdisciplinary researchers and more than a thousand Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 debtors from five federal judicial districts. Here are the most important aspects of this lengthy but fascinating article."
Posted: October 20, 2008


Ratio of Ch. 13's Is Declining in U.S. After Big Post-BAPCPA Increase, Oregon's Ch. 13 Ratio Is Holding Steady

Excerpt:"As reported in a prior Bulletin on this website entitled Oregon's Slice of the Bankruptcy Pie, although Oregon's recent per capita Chapter 7 filing rate is virtually the same as the national rate, Oregon's per capita Chapter 13 filing rate is much LESS than the national rate. This Bulletin will compare the trends in the ratio of Chapter 13's to Chapter 7's nationally to the trends in Oregon. These two trends are quite different. Examining both of them may tell us more where Oregon is heading than looking just at Oregon's.
Posted: October 16, 2008


What Must I Know about the NEW Nat'l Guard & Reservists Debt Relief Act of 2008? (Passed by Congress, & Presented to the President on Oct. 9, 2008)
Excerpt: "The National Guard and Reservists Debt Relief Act of 2008 passed the U.S. Senate by Unanimous Consent on September 30, 2008, and the House passed it with a roll call vote on October 3. The bill was presented on October 9 to the President to sign into law. Here is the Act as passed by Congress. I was not able to find any statements whether or not the President intends to sign it, but given the overwhelming Congressional support and the politically sensitive population assisted, I presume he will . The law primarily changes one subsection of the Bankruptcy Code, so it is easy to become familiar with it before its effective date."
Posted: October 14, 2008


What You and Your Clients Need to Know About Yesterday's $8.6 Billion Countrywide/Bank of America Settlement
Excerpt: "What is this a settlement of? It is the largest ever predatory lending settlement in history. It resolves many but not all lawsuits filed by states' attorneys general alleging that Countrywide Financial or one of its affiliates intentionally sold customers risky loans that it knew were unaffordable, using deceptive advertising and rewarding staff for promoting loans with higher rates and fees than customers qualified for."
Posted: October 7, 2008


Oregon's Economy Continues to Weaken, Says U. of Oregon Index of Economic Indicators (and That Was BEFORE the Events of the Last Few Weeks)
Excerpt: "The Oregon Economic Forum announced last week that the University of Oregon Index of Economic Indicators fell in August 2008 by 0.8% to 100.3 (100.0 = 1997 benchmark). That index is down from 102.4 six months earlier in February, down from 103.1 a year earlier in August 2007, and down from 106.8 & 106.2 two and three years earlier, in August 2006 and 2005, respectively."
Posted: October 6, 2008


Portland Housing Prices Continue to Decline
Excerpt: "So much of what is going on in this country's economy appears tied to the value of real estate, as in how much those "Troubled Assets" addressed by the $700 billion Congressional bailout bill are really worth. And perhaps no other index is tied so closely to the pace of personal bankruptcy filings than that of home values. So to get some good ideas where the Portland area's bankruptcy filings are heading and how quickly, here's a quick but enlightening look at Portland's home values."
Posted: October 1, 2008


Bankruptcy Mortgage Modification Cut Out of Bailout Bill: So What's In This Weekend's Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 for Homeowners?
Excerpt:
"As of Friday the mortgage modification amendment to the Bankruptcy Code was taken off the table by Democrats during the intense negotiations In the Capitol over the bailout bill, as announced in a closed-door meeting to Democrat legislators by Barney Frank, Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee. Despite this bankruptcy provision being one of the main provisions of Barney Frank's and Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd's responses to Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson's original proposal, it apparently became a "poison pill" sacrificed in order to reach compromise during the weekend."
Posted: September 29, 2008


Is BAPCPA Meeting the Goals of its Proponants?
Excerpt: "Those who work in the bankruptcy world day in and day out have infinite anecdotal experience on the effects of BAPCPA on their clients, whether creditors or debtors. Especially for those who represent only creditors or only debtors, their one-sided experience may mostly just reinforce their preconceived opinions about the Act. Especially for them, but for everybody in this bankruptcy world, it is good to get out of their trenches, now nearly two years after BAPCPA's effective date, and look at a purportedly neutral analysis of the law's effects."
Posted: September 26, 2008


BAPCPA's Effect on Trustees, US Trustees & the Bankruptcy Courts

Excerpt: "This summer the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), on request of a number of members of Congress, released a report entitled Dollar Costs Associated with the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. In it the GAO presents the financial effect of BAPCPA on the U.S. Trustee Program, on trustees, and on the federal judiciary."
Posted: September 19, 2008


BAPCPA's Increase in Debtors' Attorney Fees and Costs
Excerpt: "This summer the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), on request of a number of members of Congress, released a report entitled Dollar Costs Associated with the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. In it the GAO presents its conclusions about post-BAPCPA increases in the cost of filing bankruptcy for consumer debtors ."
Posted: September 18, 2008


Oregon Chapter 13 Distributions to General Unsecured Creditors: How Different from the Rest of the Country? Differences Btw. Trustees Long and Lynch?
Excerpt:
"Comparing the Oregon Chapter 13 cases administered by the trustees Fred Long and Brian Lynch against the national averages, for the Chapter 13 cases which were successfully completed during Fiscal Year 2007 (Oct. '06 - Sept. '07), 1) there is a substantially larger portion of 0% plans in the Oregon cases than the national average; 2) the portion that had paid 70% or more to general unsecured creditors is about the same as the national average; and 3) the portion that paid between 1% and 69% is somewhat lower than the national average."
Posted: September 16, 2008


by Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys

Thursday, October 23, 2008

Under BAPCPA Must a Debtor Who Converts to Chapter 7 from Chapter 13 File a Form B22A and Comply With the "Means Test"?


Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or perform any legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.


By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys,
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

n re Kellett, Oregon Bankruptcy Court Case No. 06-30047-rld7
In re Corbin, Oregon Bankruptcy Court Case No. 07-31645-tmb7
12/03/07


The Issue

Under BAPCPA must a debtor who convert to Chapter 7 from Chapter 13 file a Form B22A in that Chapter 7 case, even after having filed a Form B22C in the prior Chapter 13 case?

The Not-So-Quick Answer
In 17 pages, Judge Dunn answers: Yes, with exceptions possible on a case by case basis. Why does that take 17 pages? His honest answer: "The Motions [to Strike Requirement to File Official Form B22A by the debtors in the two different cases] present issues that appear to be fairly limited and straightforward at face, but as with virtually all issues that have arisen in relation to interpretation of BAPCPA provisions, there is more to these matters than at first meets the eye."

The Key Point in the Analysis

As to a debtor who FILED her Chapter 13 case but then CONVERTED to a Chapter 7 case, was that Chapter 7 case "FILED" for purpose of the "means test" requirement of § 707(b)? The § 707(b) "means test" provides that the court "may dismiss a case FILED by an individual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts . . . if it finds that the granting of relief would be an abuse of this chapter . . . ." [emphasis added]. If a converted case is not a "filed" Chapter 7 case, then "the 'means test' provisions of § 707(b) are not triggered, and any requirement(s) of the FRBPs or local bankruptcy rules that the Debtors file Forms B22A in their converted cases are precluded as inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code itself."

Judge Dunn's Rationale and Ruling
Most of the judge's analysis involved weighing the arguments contained in two recent competing bankruptcy court opinions, In re Fox, 370 B.R. 639 (Bankr. D. N. J. 2007), championed by the debtors, and In re Kerr, 2007 WL 2119291 at *5 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. July 18, 2007), favoring the U.S. Trustee's position. The former interpreted the "case filed . . . under this chapter" phrase strictly, the latter "holistically." "[T]he bankruptcy court in Fox found nothing ambiguous in Congress’s use of the phrase 'filed...under this chapter' in § 707(b)(1) and determined that § 707(b) did not apply to cases converted from another chapter." Whereas in Kerr: "The cases are now [upon conversion] entered on the Court’s docket under Chapter 7 as a result of the debtors’ filing motions for conversion. While the cases were filed under Chapter 13, they are now filed under Chapter 7."


After acknowledging that "[l]egitimate points are made on both sides of this argument," the judge was "ultimately . . . persuaded that the phrase 'case filed by an individual debtor under this chapter' does not make appropriate sense viewed in isolation and must be interpreted to encompass cases converted to chapter 7 from other chapters as well as cases filed originally in chapter 7."
Beyond the statutory construction analysis, Judge Dunn also referred to the public policy argument that to decide otherwise "opens the door to abuses": "A debtor seeking to avoid the chapter 7 'means test' and § 707(b) 'abuse' scrutiny could file a petition in chapter 13 and then turn around and convert the case to chapter 7."


The Judge's Explicit Limitations to His Holding
1) The judge acknowledged the potential practical problem of Chapter 13's which get converted to Chapter 7 because the debtor, in spite of her best efforts, could not meet the terms of the plan, but then get dismissed for "abuse" in the Chapter 7 case, leaving the debtor "with no realistic remedy in bankruptcy." Or if reconverted into Chapter 13, "the debtor could begin cycling through a perpetual 'do loop' of failures" back and forth between the two Chapters. The solution: "I hope and expect that" the U.S. Trustee will exercise discretion to avoid this.

2) Under § 348(a), conversion does not change the date of the original "petition filing," that is, it is still fixed to when the original Chapter 13 was filed. So Form B22A in the "converted case is prepared based on the debtor’s income averaged over the six months preceding the month during which the debtor’s original [Chapter 13] bankruptcy petition was filed." Since this could be years later "[i]t is questionable how meaningful an analysis based on [this] 'current monthly income' can be. Judge Dunn's solutions: 1) The debtor can rebut the presumption of abuse.; or 2) can file a motion for waiver of the requirement to file Form B22A.

3) In the two cases here, the judge exercised the case by case discretion that he promoted in his holding, waived the filing of Form B22A because in the meantime in both cases the U.S. Trustee had investigated and decided not to pursue abuse determinations, and the time for raising objections to discharge and filing motions to dismiss for abuse had expired.


by Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys

Wednesday, October 22, 2008

The Hope for Homeowners Program Launched on Oct. 1, 2008: What Do I Need to Know About It?


By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys, Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com


In the rush of events on the national financial scene of the last few weeks and months it is difficult for a bankruptcy practitioner to to keep straight the various governmental interventions much less understand their consequences on her clients and on her practice. This Bulletin shines some light on one of the initial major events--The Housing and Economic Recovery Act signed into law on July 30, 2008-- and critical aspects of its Hope for Homeowners Program, which has now been in effect since October 1.

Background

This Act was the one promoted by Treasury Secretary Paulson as the means to restore investor confidence in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, by giving him the capacity to use taxpayer funds to intervene. At a July 15 Senate Banking Committee hearing he famously said "If you have a bazooka in your pocket and people know it, you probably won't have to use it." By early September, he had to use that bazooka with the federal takeover of those critical institutions.

Within the Housing and Economic Recovery Act umbrella was a distinct Hope for Homeowners Act. This created a new program within the Federal Housing Administration (FHA)--voluntary for both lender and borrower--to back up to $300 billion in FHA-insured mortgages to distressed homeowners. Through this program an owner-occupant may be able to refinance his unaffordable mortgage to an affordable fixed-rate 30-year mortgage at the lowered principal of 90% of their present home appraised value, IF the homeowner meets a series of conditions, and IF the lender agrees. In the two and a half months since the Act's passage the agency says that it "has worked diligently to develop and implement the program as directed by Congress . . . establishing underwriting standards to ensure borrowers, after any write-down in principal, have a reasonable ability to repay their new FHA-insured mortgage." The FHA has also compiled a list of participating lenders, which it anticipates updating every Friday.

Borrower Eligibility

Here is a partial list of conditions from an October 1 news release from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD):
  • The home is their primary residence, and they have no ownership interest in any other residential property, such as second homes.

  • Their existing mortgage was originated on or before January 1, 2008, and they have made at least six payments.

  • They are not able to pay their existing mortgage without help.

  • As of March 2008, their total monthly mortgage payments due were more than 31 percent of their gross monthly income.

  • They certify they have not been convicted of fraud in the past 10 years, intentionally defaulted on debts, and did not knowingly or willingly provide material false information to obtain their existing mortgage(s).
How a Homeowner Gets Started

The FHA has detailed information on its website about the Hope for Homeowners program. As for how to get started it suggests:

There are four ways that a distressed homeowner could pursue participation in the HOPE for Homeowners program:

  1. Homeowners may contact their existing lender and/or a new lender to discuss how to qualify and their eligibility for this program.
  2. Servicers working with troubled homeowners may determine that the best solution for avoiding foreclosure is to refinance the homeowner into a HOPE for Homeowners loan.
  3. Originating lenders who are looking for ways to refinance potential customers out from under their high-cost loans and/or who are willing to work with servicers to assist distressed homeowners.
  4. Counselors who are working with troubled homeowners and their lenders to reach a mutually agreeable solution for avoiding foreclosure.
It is envisioned that the primary way homeowners will initially participate in this program is through the servicing lender on their existing mortgage. Servicers that do not have an underwriting component to their mortgage operations will partner with an FHA-approved lender that does.
Primary Resource for Following Through

The FHA website on the Hope for Homeowners program has tremendous amount of information about the program, including detailed procedural steps for borrowers as well as lenders, sample letters and forms, examples of how the program would work for certain kinds of borrowers, and even the 34 pages of last-second promulgated regulations.


by Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys

Tuesday, October 21, 2008

Self-Employed Ch. 13 Debtor Can't Deduct Business Expenses to Determine Whether Debtor Has Above/Below Median Income, and Thus a 3 or 5-Year Plan


By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys, Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com


Drummond v. Wiegand (In re Wiegand)
9th Circuit BAP No. MT-07-1431 JuPaD, 2008 WL 1733148 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2008)
April 3, 2008

A 9th Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (which included Judge Randy Dunn) has ruled that a self-employed Chapter 13 debtor may not subtract business expenses from gross business income in arriving at "current monthly income," even though Form 22C clearly provides for this subtraction. So individual debtors must use their gross monthly business income to calculate whether they are above or below median income, which in turn determines whether their plan's applicable commitment period is 3 years or 5 years.

The BAP's Analysis

In this post-BAPCPA statutory construction case, the BAP used a combination of "the plain meaning rule" and "a holistic approach" to resolve the new law's lack of clarity in its definition of "current monthly income" in § 101(10A)," whether for a self-employed debtor this term includes all monthly gross business receipts or rather only net business income after deducting business expenses.

The Court put much weight on the "plain and unambiguous" § 1325(b)(2)
, which defines "disposable income" to be "current monthly income" minus, "if the debtor is engaged in business, the payment of expenditures necessary for the continuation, preservation, and operation of such business." If the Code clearly defines "disposable income" to be "current monthly income" minus business expenses in § 1325(b)(2), then "current monthly income" itself must include all business income before deducting business expenses. Otherwise, "[I]f business expenses are deducted from gross receipts to determine a chapter 13 debtor’s current monthly income, then there would be no need for § 1325(b)(2)(B), which provides for the same deductions."


In addition, "current monthly income" is defined in § 101(10A), as the “average monthly income from all sources that the debtor receives . . . without regard to whether such income is taxable income.” After acknowledging that the Code does not define "income," the BAP "conclude[d] that the plain language of the statute demonstrates that the bankruptcy court’s reliance on the Tax Code and Form 1040 to determine the meaning of income under § 101(10A) was misplaced. The phrase “without regard to whether such income is taxable income” in § 101(10A) reflects a clear congressional intent that Tax Code concepts for determining taxable income are inapplicable to a determination of current monthly income."


Practical Consequences on the Use of Flawed Official Form 22B


But what about Official Form 22B, promulgated by the U.S. Judicial Conference last November and effective January 1, 2008 (just 4 months prior to this Wiegand opinion)? In its Section I "Report of Income" used to determine the "applicable commitment period" of 3 or 5 years in Part II, the form explicitly has debtors with "Income from the operation of a business, profession, or farm" subtract their "Ordinary and necessary business expenses" from their "Gross receipts"in order to arrive at their "Business income." Here the BAP holds that "[t]his mandate compels us to conclude that Form 22C ought to be changed to comply with the statute."

But Form 22C was not on the list of Official Forms that were approved at the U.S. Judicial Conference last month to be effective this December. What to do in the many months or even years in the meantime? The BAP made the following suggestion in its final footnote:
Until Form 22C is changed, one possible solution is for below-median debtors to subtract the business deductions allowed under § 1325(b)(2)(B) on Schedule J from their current income. Above-median debtors should fill out the remainder of Form 22C and utilize the Internal Revenue service standards under §§ 1325(b)(3) and 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) for “Other Necessary Expenses,” as specified in the Internal Revenue Service Financial Analysis Handbook. Arnold, 376 B.R. at 654-55. We leave open the possibility that bankruptcy courts may take other approaches to redress the inconsistency of Form 22C with Code §§ 101(10A) and 1325(b)(2)(B).
Interestingly, the successful appellant in this case, the Chapter 13 Trustee in Montana, Robert Drummond, has subsequently provided his own subsequent analysis of the case, and on this Form 22C matter states:
The judicial conference will have to reconsider Form 22C and determine the appropriate portion of the form which should allow the deduction of business expenses. Business expenses should not be deducted under Part I of the form when computing current monthly income - and the judicial conference should revisit the form for the purpose of revising and correcting the place for the deduction of business expenses.
Impact of 9th Circuit's In re Kagenveama

This Wiegand opinion was decided two months before before the 9th Circuit's In re Kagenveama, in my view the most important 9th Circuit bankruptcy opinion of the year. Kagenveama applied a strict reading to BAPCPA's new terms, "projected disposable income" and "applicable commitment period," with the result that an above-median income debtor who had a negative income on Form B22C, and thus no "projected disposable income," had no requirement to pay unsecured creditors and no requirement to pay into the Chapter 13 plan for 5 years, or for any other particular period of time. (Please see my Bulletin of 9/3/08 on Kagenveama.) It is beyond the scope of this Bulletin to definitively analyze the impact of Kagenveama on Wiegand, but here are some thoughts.

There appear to be some aspects of Wiegand that are not perfectly consistent with Kagenveama--for example the BAP's reference in a footnote that "[w]e have found the applicable commitment period to be a temporal requirement.". But in my judgment Kagenveama did not effectively overturn Wiegand. There is no direct reference to Wiegand in Kagenveama, because oral arguments in the latter occurred many months before Wiegand was published. And Weigand did not rely on the only 9th Circuit BAP opinion which Kagenveama expressly overturned, In re Pak, 378 B.R. 257, 267 (9th Cir. BAP 2007).

But the cases do overlap, slightly but with potentially huge consequences for a certain population of debtors. Wiegand deals with how a Chapter 13 business owners calculate their "current monthly income" in order to arrive at their "applicable commitment period," whereas Kagenveama interprets "applicable commitment period" in the limited context of above-median income debtors who show negative "monthly disposable income" after deducting expense at the end of Form 22C. Wiegand will push more Chapter 13 business owners above median income in Part I of Form 22C, which paradoxically will qualify them for the huge potential benefits of Kagenveama, IF their expenses in Part IV (apparently including some business expenses per the BAP's suggestion above) exceed their income.

by Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys