Friday, December 12, 2008

The Ninth Circuit BAP Gap in Published Opinions; Its Last Three Unpublished but Citeable Memoranda

By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys, Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com



The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel has not published an opinion since early August, more than four months ago. (For a summary of that most recent opinion see my Litigation Report entitled The "Law of the Case" Doctrine Applied in the Most Recent 9th Circuit BAP Opinion, Written by Judge Dunn.) This is surprising because in 2008 before August and throughout 2007 the largest gap in published opinions was only about six weeks. In fact, throughout 2005 and 2006 not a single month passed without at least one published opinion. Furthermore, during the calendar years 2005, 2006 & 2007, the BAP published no less than 32 published opinions. So far this year--half-way through December--it has published only 15. A phone call to the BAP Clerk's Office in Pasadena, California asking about this yielded a slightly defensive retort to the effect that "well, we are generating many unpublished memoranda opinions," without any admission of an uncharacteristic gap in published opinions. There seems to be more to this story, and if there is anything newsworthy about it I will report it in a future Bulletin. In the meantime, here are short summaries of the three most recent BAP unpublished but still potentially very valuable memoranda, all from November 2008, two of which had Oregon's Judge Randall Dunn on the three judge panel.

Citeability of the BAP's Unpublished Memoranda

The following cautionary note introduces these memoranda on the Court's website: "All memoranda are unpublished. Memoranda issued before January 1, 2007 may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except under the limited circumstances specified in Ninth Circuit BAP Rule 8013-1(c). In accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, memoranda issued on or after January 1, 2007 may be cited without restriction."

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 32.1 is titled "Citing Judicial Dispositions" and states in full:
(a) Citation Permitted. A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been:
(i) designated as “unpublished,” “not for publication,” “non-precedential,” “not precedent,” or the like; and
(ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007.
Each of the BAP's unpublished memoranda included here have the following as their first footnote:
"This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1."

In turn, the most pertinent part of 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1 is subsection (c) stating: "Unpublished memoranda and orders have no precedential value and may not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel." (The rest of the Rule has aspects of interest not directly relevant here, such as the criteria for determining whether a BAP's decision becomes a published opinion or instead an unpublished memorandum, and the procedure to request that a memorandum be turned into an opinion--see the entire Rule 8013-1 at the end of this Bulletin.)

So, under Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure all unpublished but written dispositions of any federal court since the beginning of 2007 may be cited, but under the 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1(c) citation seems not to be permitted except in the very limited contexts of "the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel."

However the indicated footnote then says that particular case "may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have," seemingly contradicting the restriction of the BAP Rule. Perhaps the answer is in 9th Cir. Rule 36-3 (a) and (b):
Citation of Unpublished Dispositions or Orders
(a) Not Precedent: Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court are not precedent, except when relevant under the doctrine of law of the case or rules of claim preclusion or issue preclusion.
(b) Citation of Unpublished Dispositions and Orders Issued on or after January 1, 2007: Unpublished dispositions and orders of this court issued on or after January 1, 2007 may be cited to the courts of this circuit in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1.
The bottom line: Citation is permitted to unpublished memoranda for persuasive value--9th Cir. Rule 36-3 (b) trumps any seeming contradiction arising out of 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1(c). The best proof: see footnote 6 in the BAP's own unpublished memorandum in Olympic Coast Investment v. Crum (In re Wright) below, in which the BAP itself cites a Ninth Circuit "unpublished non-precedential decision" "for its persuasive value." Even though the BAP's use of that Ninth Circuit decision was technically governed by 9th Cir. Rule 36-3 (b) instead of 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1(c), I believe the BAP would endorse the use of its own unpublished memoranda in the same fashion.

The Three November 2008 Memoranda

Jared v. Keahey (In re Keahey)

BAP No. WW-08-1151-PaJuKa
November 3, 2008

Issue: Did the bankruptcy court err in "finding that a creditor’s attorney committed the tort of outrage and violated his fiduciary duties as a deed of trust trustee in connection with his repeated, abusive attempts to collect a debt secured by the debtor’s home"?
Holding: "The bankruptcy court did not err in finding that [creditor] committed the [Washington state] tort of outrage," in that 1) the conduct at issue was "extreme and outrageous," "the infliction was intentional or reckless," and the recipient "suffered extreme emotional distress" as a result of the conduct.

Olympic Coast Investment v. Crum (In re Wright)
BAP No. MT-08-1164-MoDH
November 3, 2008

Issue: Does a Chapter 7 trustee's distribution to creditors render as moot the appeal by a creditor which did not receive any payment through that distribution? Specifically, if that 7 trustee proposed and received a court order, over an undersecured creditor's objection, to make a final distribution paying nothing to that undersecured creditor because it had filed a proof of claim failing to specify the amount of the unsecured portion, and never filed an amended proof of claim so specifying, would the creditor's appeal of the distribution order be moot if it did not seek to stay the distribution order pending the appeal and the distribution to creditors occurred while the appeal was pending?
Holding: The BAP held that it lacks jurisdiction over appeals that are moot, and this case was "equitably moot" in that the appellant failed "to pursue their available remedies to obtain a stay of the objectionable orders of the Bankruptcy Court" and so allowed "such a comprehensive change of circumstances to occur as to render it inequitable ... to consider the merits of the appeal." The court also stated that, had it not dismissed the appeal as equitably moot, it would rule on the merits that "a trustee does not have to make distributions to an undersecured creditor who did not amend its claim to assert or estimate the unsecured portion."

Kosmala v. Cook (In re Cook)
BAP No. CC-08-1091-HMoD
November 3, 2008

Issue: Was a debtor's interest in a trust property of his Chapter 7 estate? Particularly, did debtor acquire an interest in trust property under § 541(a)(5)(A) as a "bequest, devise or inheritance" acquired within 180 days of the Chapter 7 filing, since most of the trust assets were transferred to the trust by his mother's will, or instead is debtor's interest in the trust property excluded from property of the Chapter 7 estate because his interest merely vested at the time of the mother's death. § 541(a)(5) includes in the bankruptcy estate “any interest in property that would have been property of the estate if such interest had been an interest of the debtor on the date of the filing of the petition, and that the debtor acquires or becomes entitled to acquire within 180 days after such date-- (A) by bequest, devise, or inheritance."

Holding: Looking to state law to define debtor's interest in the trust, on the facts here under California law the trust was not a testamentary trust but rather an inter vivos one, and the devise of the assets to the trust through the will did not make the trust testamentary. "[T]the Properties were devised through a pour over provision to the Trust, not to the Debtor. The Debtor was a
contingent beneficiary of the Trust at the date of his bankruptcy filing and had no direct interest in the Properties." The BAP affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court.

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Rule 8013-1
DISPOSITION OF APPEAL
(a) OPINION or MEMORANDUM. The Panel may determine that a written disposition of a matter before the Panel will be designated an OPINION if it:
(1) Establishes, alters, modifies or clarifies a rule of law;
(2) Calls attention to a rule of law which appears to have been generally overlooked;
(3) Criticizes existing law; or
(4) Involves a legal or factual issue of unique interest or substantial public importance.
A written disposition of a case not designated for publication will be captioned a MEMORANDUM.
(b) PUBLICATION. Publication of a final disposition means the BAP Clerk will release a copy to recognized channels for dissemination. Only opinions, and orders designated for publication by the Panel, will be published.
(c) CITATION. Unpublished memoranda and orders have no precedential value and may not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
(d) REQUEST FOR PUBLICATION. Any party may request, by letter, that the Panel publish a memorandum. The request must be received no later than 30 days after the filing of the memorandum and must state concisely the reasons for publication.

by Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys

Thursday, December 11, 2008

Judge Kozinski-led Ninth Circuit Panel Denies Petition for En Banc Rehearing: Espinosa, Major Student Loan Opinion Still Stands


By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys, Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com


Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc.
9th Circuit No. 06-16421
Originally filed October 2, 2008, Amended December 10, 2008
Order Amending Opinion, and Amended Opinion




The Original Opinion
The day after the Ninth Circuit originally released this opinion, I wrote the following entitled Bulletin:

Major New Student Loan Opinion: 9th Circuit Allows Chapter 13 Discharge of Student Loans WITHOUT Adversary Proceeding by Mere Inclusion in Plan

That Bulletin started as follows:
Can a Chapter 13 debtor discharge a student loan by including it in the plan but without filing an adversary proceeding to determine debtor's undue hardship, if the student loan creditor fails to object to the plan? In this opinion filed by the 9th Circuit yesterday, its Chief Judge Kozinski emphatically answered: "yes."

This is an amazing opinion. It is one of the most colorful opinions I've read in months (see some of that "color" quoted below). In overturning the District Court appellate decision and following its own 9th Circuit precedents, it strongly rejected constitutional arguments to the contrary by the 4th, 6th & 7th Circuits as well as statutory arguments to the contrary by the 2nd and [en banc]10th Circuits.


The Amended Opinion
Now just released yesterday is this
Order Amending Opinion, and Amended Opinion which is unusual in two respects.

1) The Amendments
First, there are an unusual number of amendments to the original opinion. Characteristically, there are one or two corrections or insertions when an opinion is amended. Here, there are seven, covering two full pages. I am speculating, but given that the author is the idiosyncratic Chief Judge Kozinski, and the opinion goes against the grain of other Circuit opinions, including an en banc one, the good judge decided to try to tweak his arguments to try to present the best case for when the argument eventually lands in the Supreme Court.

2) Denial of Petition for Rehearing En Banc
Second, the Order Amending Opinion concludes as follows:

The petition for rehearing en banc is denied. See Fed R. App. P. 35. No further petitions may be filed and all pending motions are denied.
Fed R. App. P. 35 states in pertinent part as follows:
Rule 35. En Banc Determination

(a) When Hearing or Rehearing En Banc May Be Ordered.

A majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service and who are not disqualified may order that an appeal or other proceeding be heard or reheard by the court of appeals en banc. An en banc hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless:

(1) en banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions; or

(2) the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.

(b) Petition for Hearing or Rehearing En Banc.

A party may petition for a hearing or rehearing en banc.

(1) The petition must begin with a statement that either:

(A) the panel decision conflicts with a decision of the United States Supreme Court or of the court to which the petition is addressed (with citation to the conflicting case or cases) and consideration by the full court is therefore necessary to secure and maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions; or

(B) the proceeding involves one or more questions of exceptional importance, each of which must be concisely stated; for example, a petition may assert that a proceeding presents a question of exceptional importance if it involves an issue on which the panel decision conflicts with the authoritative decisions of other United States Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue.

Note that the Rule in the last sentence above in effect defines "questions of exceptional importance" in such a way that it seems highly applicable to this panel opinion. As stated in my quote from my Bulletin on the original opinion, this Espinosa "panel decision" clearly "conflicts with authoritative decisions of other United States Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue." Yet Judge Kozinski denies the petition for rehearing en banc summarily, without any explanation whatsoever why this is not "a question of exceptional importance," how it does not conflict with other Courts of Appeals "authoritative decisions" when it so plainly does so.

I finished the earlier Bulletin on the original opinion with a section entitled "Not Need En Banc Revi
ew," which stated:
The coup de grace of Judge Kozinski's opinion was his repeated assertions that his three-judge panel did NOT need to call for an en banc rehearing in spite of conflicts with so many other Circuits, as well as with a number of decisions in the 9th Circuit BAP and 9th Circuit bankruptcy courts. Why?: He simply did not find those other cases persuasive.
ConcIusion
I finished my earlier Bulletin with:

[Judge Kozinski] is pushing a rationale based in large part on a 10th Circuit case that was repudiated last year by an en banc decision of the 10th Circuit. Principled and gutsy, or stubborn and erroneous, in any event it's an entertaining opinion.
Now in Judge Kozinski's (and his fellow 3-judge panel mates') summary denial of the petition for rehearing en banc and his sprucing up of the opinion with his amendments, he is showing that the Chief Judge is boss and is presenting his best case for knowing better than the other Circuits.


by Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys

Monday, December 8, 2008

Caution: A Bankruptcy Crimes "Sweep" May Be Coming to a Neighborhood Near You


By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys, Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com


As bankruptcy filings increase and individual debtors' attorney offices get more stressed, it may be tempting to let office procedures get lax and to allow corners to be cut in the name of efficient service. As the seriousness of the difficult economy takes hold and some people feel victimized by circumstances beyond their control, there appears to be at least anecdotal indications that more debtors are resorting to cheating the system that they feel has cheated them. So let the following be a cautionary tale.

In one federal district, the Southern District of West Virginia, based in Charleston, the U.S. Trustee's office and the U.S. Attorney combined forces to investigate and charge four different individual debtors with diverse bankruptcy crimes. The details of the charges should both remind debtors' counsel of the kinds of details to pay special attention to and be a short lesson in the most common bankruptcy crime statutes.

Bankruptcy Crime Statutes 18 U.S.C. §§ 152 and 157
§ 152 is entitled "Concealment of assets; false oaths and claims; bribery." It lists nine types of sanctioned behavior, but these four cases involve only the first three types, the concealment of assets, making false oath and a false declaration:
A person who
(1) knowingly and fraudulently conceals from a custodian, trustee, marshal, or other officer of the court charged with the control or custody of property, or, in connection with a case under title 11, from creditors or the United States Trustee, any property belonging to the estate of a debtor;
(2) knowingly and fraudulently makes a false oath or account in or in relation to any case under title 11;
(3) knowingly and fraudulently makes a false declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, in or in relation to any case under title 11;
. . .
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.

The remaining six kinds of sanctioned behavior are noteworthy because many involve potential crimes by parties other than debtors. A summary of these include:
(4) a creditor or alleged creditor filing a false proof of claim;
(5) a transferee wrongfully receiving property from a debtor after the filing of a bankruptcy case;
6) receiving a bribe--"any money or property, remuneration, compensation, reward, advantage, or promise thereof"--or order to take or avoid any action in a bankruptcy case;
(7) pre-petition transfers or concealment of debtor assets by the debtor or by others, including the debtor's agents and officers;
(8) pre-petition and post-petition concealment, falsification, or destruction of records about a debtor's property or financial affairs by the debtor or by others; and
(9) post-petition withholding of records about a debtor's property or financial affairs by the debtor or by others.
§ 157 is entitled "Bankruptcy fraud," and states in its entirety:
A person who, having devised or intending to devise a scheme or artifice to defraud and for the purpose of executing or concealing such a scheme or artifice or attempting to do so -

(1) files a petition under title 11, including a fraudulent involuntary bankruptcy petition under section 303 of such title;

(2) files a document in a proceeding under title 11, including a fraudulent involuntary bankruptcy petition under section 303 of such title; or

(3) makes a false or fraudulent representation, claim, or promise concerning or in relation to a proceeding under title 11, including a fraudulent involuntary bankruptcy petition under section 303 of such title, at any time before or after the filing of the petition, or in relation to a proceeding falsely asserted to be pending under such title,

shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
The Four Accused Debtors
Victoria Caudill, 51, was accused of transferring $60,000, that she had received in a workers' compensation settlement from the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security, into another person's bank account and then failing to disclose this asset in her bankruptcy case. She was indicted by the federal grand jury for concealing assets (18 U.S.C. 152(1)), making a false declaration (18 U.S.C. 152(3)) and devising a bankruptcy fraud scheme (157(3)).

Clinton Smith, 62, was accused of falsely declaring in his 2004 bankruptcy case that his wife still owed a 50-acre parcel of land the couple had bought back in 1977 but had in fact been sold the previous year for about $207,000, his half-share of which was being paid to him in payments of $2,000 per month. He failed to disclose this income. He was indicted by the federal grand jury for concealing assets (18 U.S.C. 152(1)), making a false declaration (18 U.S.C. 152(3)) and devising a bankruptcy fraud scheme (157(3)).

Jennifer Longwell, 38, was accused of falsely disclosing that she had sold a parcel of real property for $20,000 when in fact she had sold it for $69,000; she falsely disclosed that she continued own another parcel when in fact she had sold it the day before. She also gave false testimony at the meeting of creditors about those transactions. She was indicted by the federal grand jury with two counts of making a false oath (18 U.S.C. 152(2)) and one count of concealing assets (18 U.S.C. 152(1)).

Tracy Helms, 42, was accused of concealing guns and jewelry in her bankruptcy case. She was not indicted by grand jury but rather the U.S. Attorney's office filed an "information" against her for concealing these assets (18 U.S.C. 152(1)).

Potential Criminal Penalties

As indicated in the quoted statutes above, both 18 U.S.C. § 152 and § 157 provide for a fine and/or up to 5 years of imprisonment. However local newspaper accounts state that that the three indicted individuals face up to 15 years in prison, and one story last month in the Charleston, West Virgina News & Sentinel said that Ms. Longwell faced 15 years in prison, three years probation and up to $750,000 in fines.

The U.S. Attorney's Warning

The local U.S. Attorney Charles T. Miller said that these cases should "serve as a warning to those who would abuse the [bankruptcy] system." The U.S. Trustee's Office refers suspicious circumstances to his office, the FBI then investigates, and then his office decides whether to prosecute. His parting words: "It's pretty straightforward in bankruptcy: You list what you have, you list what you owe, and you get a clean slate. It's when you hold [assets] back that [you] get into trouble."




by Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys

Thursday, December 4, 2008

Ninth Circuit Limits Section 502(b)(6) Cap on Claims by Landlord to Lost Rental Income, Does Not Extend This Cap to Collateral Claims by Landlord


By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys, Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com


El Toro Materials Co. v. Saddleback Valley Community Church (In re El Toro Materials Co.)
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Case No. 05-56164
Filed October 1, 2007
Opinion by Judge Alex Kozinski
(subsequently appointed Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit)


These Bulletins often present appellate opinions the day after they are released, but this Ninth Circuit opinion from last year is worth a look because 1) the holding and its rationale is quite straightforward, so it's easy to learn from; 2) the opinion involves, directly and indirectly two of the more interesting people living in the Ninth Circuit; and 3) because the subject in controversy is one million tons of mud. Even hard-
working bankruptcy attorneys every once in a while get to come out of the trenches and play in the mud.

The Two Personalities
The opinion's author, Alex Kozinski, who shortly after this opinion became the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. He became a U.S. Court of Appeals judge at 35, the youngest in the country. His opinions are common-sensical and humorous, reflecting fearless libertarian instincts. Emigrated from Romania at 12, his parents both Holocaust survivors, he still speaks, as he says, "with an accent close to [California Governor] Schwarzenegger's." (Please see my prior Bulletin featuring another opinion he authored: "Major New Student Loan Opinion: 9th Circuit Allows Chapter 13 Discharge of Student Loans WITHOUT Adversary Proceeding by Mere Inclusion in Plan."

The pastor of the successful appellant here, Saddleback Church, is Rick Warren, author of one of the best-selling books in history, "The Purpose-Driven Life," and "unquestionably the U.S.'s most influential and highest-profile churchman" in the opinion of a recent Time article on him His church was the venue for the "civil forum" last August featuring the two Presidential candidates, which he moderated. The event was affirmation of his stature. He is not named in the opinion.

The Simple Facts and the Interpreted Statute
This church is the landlord with the million tons of mud left by the debtor, El Toro Materials, upon its rejection of a lease under § 365(a) of the Code. It brought an adversary proceeding "claiming $23 million in damages for the alleged cost of removing the mess, under theories of waste, nuisance, trespass and breach of contract." § 502(b)(6) states that if an objection is made to a claim by a creditor the bankruptcy court
shall determine the amount of such claim . . . and shall allow such claim in such amount, except to the extent that--
(6) if such claim is the claim of a lessor for damages resulting from the termination of a lease of real property, such claim exceeds--(A) the rent reserved by such lease, without acceleration, for the greater of one year, or 15 percent, not to exceed three years, of the remaining term of such lease . . . .
That last subsection is a cap on the amount of the claim at either one year of rent on the remaining term of the lease, or, if it is greater, the rent for 15 percent of the remaining term of the lease, but at most three years of rent. The issue is whether that cap on a claim by "lessor for damages resulting from the termination" of a real estate lease caps not just future rent pegged to the periods stated in subsection (A), but also caps other damages owed by the lessee-debtor to the landlord. Such as the cost of removing two billion pounds of mud.

Judge Kozinski Explains
The holding was one of simple statutory construction supported by case law, but the judge presented it quite differently than most jurists. Instead of going right to the statute and case law, he starts by looking at the purpose of the cap for landlord-creditor claim amounts, its economic and historical context, with the help of a touch of legislative history: "The damages cap was 'designed to compensate the landlord for his loss while not permitting a claim so large (based on a long-term lease) as to prevent other general unsecured creditors from recovering a dividend from the estate.”

Then Judge Kozinski begins the core of his analysis with common sense:
The structure of the cap—measured as a fraction of the remaining term—suggests that damages other than those based on a loss of future rental income are not subject to the cap. It makes sense to cap damages for lost rental income based on the amount of expected rent: Landlords may have the ability to mitigate their damages by re-leasing or selling the premises, but will suffer injury in proportion to the value of their lost rent in the meantime. In contrast, collateral damages are likely to bear only a weak correlation to the amount of rent.
Then he moves to public policy:

One major purpose of bankruptcy law is to allow creditors to receive an aliquot share of the estate to settle their debts. Metering these collateral damages by the amount of the rent would be inconsistent with the goal of providing compensation to each creditor in proportion with what it is owed.
Only then does he seem to even look at the details of the statute at issue:

The statutory language supports this interpretation. The cap applies to damages “resulting from” the rejection of the lease. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6). Saddleback’s claims for waste, nuisance and trespass do not result from the rejection of the lease—they result from the pile of dirt allegedly left on the property. . . . . The million-ton heap of dirt was not put there by the rejection of the lease—it was put there by the actions and inactions of El Toro in preparing to turn over the site.
He then returns back to common-sense public policy:

Interpreting the section 502(b)(6) cap to include damage collateral to the lease would also create a perverse incentive for tenants to reject their lease in bankruptcy instead of running it out: Rejecting the lease would allow the tenant to cap its liability for any collateral damage to the premises and thus reduce its overall liability, even if staying on the property would otherwise be desirable and preserve the operating value of the business
. . . .
This would both reduce the operating value of the business and deny recovery to a creditor—a lose-lose situation counter to bankruptcy policy
. . .
Further, extending the cap to cover any collateral damage to the premises wuold allow a post-petition but pre-rejection tenant to cause any amount of damage to the premises- either negligently or intentionally--without fear of liability beyond the cap.
Almost as an afterthought, in his second-to-last paragraph, the judge refers to only one other court opinion, the only one in the entire body of his opinion that he deigns worthy of mention outside the ancient cases he refers to earlier for historical context, and mentions it only for the purpose of overruling it--a Ninth Circuit BAP opinion that the underlying BAP in this case relied on. He provides no explanation why this prior case was wrongly decided, other than to mention in a footnote that two concurring judges in the current case's BAP "expressed reservations" about it. Other than this, and a short footnote distinguishing a potentially contrary Ninth Circuit opinion from the issue in this case, Judge Kozinski's holding is supported in his opinion by no case law whatsoever, reflecting his usual audacity.


The Judge's Advice to the Entire Ninth Circuit BAP
Perhaps anticipating his ascension to the Chief Judge role, but more likely just reflecting his assertive personality, Judge Kozinski gave the following procedural recommendation to the Ninth Circuit's Bankruptcy Appellate Panel:
When the [BAP] believes that one of its precedents is wrongly decided or otherwise deserves reconsideration [as two of the three judges in the panel did in this case], the goal of judicial efficiency may be best served by allowing the BAP itself to overrule its own precedent. The BAP, promulgating its rules under supervision of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council, has not yet implemented a rule creating an en banc procedure.[Citation excluded.] As this case suggests, the time may be ripe for the BAP to consider instituting such a procedure.
In other words, he's telling the BAP: don't waste the Ninth Circuit's time on cases relying on bad BAP precedent; instead come up with a procedure for dumping such bad BAP law on your own.




by Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys

Wednesday, December 3, 2008

Hedge Funds Scoff at Congress' Chapter 13 Mortgage Modification Threat: Funds Sue Countrywide and Jeopardize Its Huge Modification Settlement


By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys, Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com


A few weeks ago Congress directly warned two specific huge hedge funds, and the industry in general, not to undercut federal efforts at encouraging voluntary home mortgage modifications. These two hedge funds, Greenwich Financial Services and Braddock Financial Corporation, were apparently "instructing the servicers of their mortgages to defy this national program and to insist on further socially and economically damaging foreclosures."

This strong warning came specifically in the form of a very explicit statement by the chairman of the House Financial Services Committee and five of his pertinent subcommittee chairs (and in letters addressed personally to the presidents of
Greenwich Financial and of Braddock Financial Corporation, and to the Managed Funds Association ("The Global Voice of the Alternative Investment Industry").) These influential members of Congress, albeit all Democrats, clearly threatened to "invoke the protection of the bankruptcy laws on single family residences" if these two particular hedge funds and the industry in general does not "reverse this policy."

But then this Monday (12/1/08), Greenwich Financial, whose president, William Frey, has been an outspoken critic of mortgage modifications, threw down its own gauntlet, in the form of a lawsuit filed in New York State Supreme Court in Manhattan, against Countrywide Financial Corp., now owned by Bank of America. This proposed class-action lawsuit seeks to require that Countrywide pays to the 374 securitization trusts involved the FULL VALUE of all the mortgage loans that Countrywide had sold to them, reflecting a total debt of about $80 billion. In October Countrywide had settled predatory lending charges by fifteen state attorneys general by agreeing to reduce mortgages by $8.4 billion through mandatory mortgage modifications. (See my 10/7/08 Bulletin on this settlement, called What You and Your Clients Need to Know About Yesterday's $8 Billion Countrywide/Bank of America Settlement).

The persistent Gordian Knot preventing solution of the mortgage meltdown has been the ownership of a large portion of mortgages not by single creditors but by multiple parties through the infamous mortgage backed securities.

At the outset, the mortgages backed by these securities include a disproportionate share of the troubled loans. As stated last month by James Lockhart, the head of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, in his own plea to the holders of these securities:
The performance of private label mortgage backed securities that were sliced and diced and sold to investors is just the opposite of Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s [which "only represent 20% of serious delinquencies".] Private label securities represent less than 20% of the mortgages but 60% of the serious delinquencies. As the regulator of the housing GSEs [Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] that own over a quarter of a trillion dollars of private label securities, I ask the private label MBS [mortgage backed securities] servicers and investors to rapidly adopt this program as the industry standard. Not only will this streamlined program assist borrowers, but broad acceptance and effective implementation could stabilize communities and property values.
And for a variety of reasons, in part because of the multiple owners involved, convincing the holders of these private lable MBS's--often hedge funds and brokerage firms--to agree to mortgage modifications has been very difficult. This has greatly stymied the various much-ballyhooed federal mortgage modification initiatives of the last few months. With the major exception of the aggressive modification efforts by the FDIC at institutions that it has taken over--including IndyMac in July and Downey Federal Savings last month--the various governmental programs have all been voluntary on the part of the mortgage holders. Appeals to the common good, such as in the ones quoted above by the FHFA's Lockhart, or even Congressional threats have thus far not proved very effective.

The one major MANDATORY mortgage modification program has been the one agreed upon by Countrywide/Bank of America in the largest ever predatory lending settlement in history. It was scheduled to go into effect December 1, 2008. So Greenwich Financial's decision to target this program, or at least to try to draw a bright line in favor of investors' rights here, is fascinating. In some respects this week's lawsuit by Greenwich Financial against Countrywide could be seen as merely a strong ($8 billion!) message that it wasn't part of the settlement with the state attorneys general and so it refuses to share in the losses agreed to by Countrywide and its owner, Bank of America. As Greenwich's Frey said in written testimony in response to the Congressional ire referred to at the beginning of this Bulletin (oddly, he was not compelled to testify in person in spite of being invited to in the above letter from the Congresspersons): “These [residential MBE] investors are not only investment banks, college endowment funds, and sovereign wealth funds, but ordinary Americans in significant numbers.” And as he said in reference to Greenwich's lawsuit, "[Countrywide's] intention is to modify them, and they don't have the right to do that." Greenwich is merely seeking a declaratory judgment that it, and the other involved investors for whom it is seeking class action status, will not have to take any losses related to this massive settlement.

But Countrywide's response is that "[l]oan modifications have been occurring for decades without objections or challenges, so we are especially troubled at the timing of this complaint. . . . . We are confident any attempt to stop this program will be legally unsupportable.” In other words, we are being (forced to be) flexible--shouldn't the investors be as well?

The bottom line is that as policy makers seek ways to pressure and entice lenders to modify mortgages, the investors in the creative instruments backing up these mortgages are understandably asserting their contract rights, and now resorting to litigation. Given the phenomenal sums involved, this is not at all surprising. But if the investors and their agents refuse to be flexible about accepting reductions in value, while others in the financial chain are sharing in the pain, this reveals the continued intractability of the problem, and the severe limitations of voluntary solutions. And litigation delay is systemically dangerous because every passing month without efficient and workable solutions to the home mortgage meltdown causes ever broader economic fallout. Thus as the Congressional warning stated, these actions by the hedge funds are greatly undercutting the arguments of those "in the financial community" that mortgage modification through bankruptcy "would be damaging" and "would not be necessary to achieve the economically desirable result of reduced foreclosures." Given the bellicose behavior of Greenwich Financial and the general turf-protecting behavior of its industry, we shall see during this delicate transition to and beginning of a new Congress and new Administration whether the threatened "much tougher legislation," in the form of bankruptcy mortgage modifications or otherwise, will be forthcoming.


POSTSCRIPT: One of the most sadly entertaining items I have read in months came across my screen in researching for this story, testimony in 2003 by an attorney for Orrick, Herrington, and Sutcliffe, LLP, a "global law firm" with 21 offices on three continents, at a House subcommittee hearing on "Preventing Abusive Lending While Preserving Access to Credit," in which he argued against "[w]ell intended, but overly restrictive, regulation" in the securitization arena. In light of the events of the past few months, the following portions of his testimony will make you both laugh and cry:
Securitization reflects innovation in the financial markets at its best.

Virtually all ... MBS [mortgage backed securities] are rated by independent rating agencies whose analyses is watched closely by investors as a guide to the credit quality of the securities. In almost all cases, rating agencies monitor the performance of the securities on an ongoing basis.
Securitization reallocates risk at many levels. By shifting the credit risk of the securitized assets (for a price) to ... MBS [mortgage backed securities] investors, financial institutions can reduce their own risk. As the risk level of an individual institution declines, so does systemic risk, or the risk faced by the financial system overall.
Good to see that "systemic risk" and "the risk faced by the financial system" has been reallocated so seamlessly.



by Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys

Tuesday, December 2, 2008

The Best of the Nov. '08 Bulletins: Stories on BAPCPA's Unintended Economic Consequences, Effect of Decrease in Credit on B'cy Filings, & More


By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys, Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com



Here is a list with which to easily access some of the best recent Bulletins from this website. Just click on the title to link to that story. I have two kinds of daily "Practice-Critical Bankruptcy Bulletins" on this website: 1) summaries of court opinions--mostly from the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the 9th Circuit, and the Oregon U.S. District Court and Bankruptcy Court, with occasional especially noteworthy ones from elsewhere; and 2) stories about the local and national economy, legislation, bankruptcy statistics and other areas of interest to bankruptcy professionals. The following list is from this second category of Bulletins, and includes all Bulletins published last month of this category. A short excerpt follows each title.

Please feel free to comment on any story--just click on the blue word "COMMENTS" immediately after the body of that Bulletin. I respond to all comments.



At the Extreme of BAPCPA's Unintended Consequences: Did Arcane Provisions of BAPCPA Contribute to the Bear Stearns, Lehman Bros. & AIG Collapses?
Excerpt: "So how could mere bankruptcy code changes designed to protect financial institutions, and pushed by knowledgeable organizations like the Securities Industry & Financial Markets Association and the International Swaps & Derivatives Association, lead to the demise of some of the most venerable of these institutions? By newly exempting credit default swaps and mortgage repurchase agreements from the automatic stay, instruments which Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers used extensively, creditors of these institutions--such as hedge funds and other financial institutions--no longer had the disincentive that the institutions could file bankruptcy and freeze their transactions and their collateral if they were pushed too hard."
Posted: November 3, 2008

The Effect of a Decrease in Credit Availability on the Number of Future Bankruptcy Filings
Excerpt: "According to The Paradox of Consumer Credit, by Robert M. Lawless, a professor at the University of Illinois College of Law, empirical data supports the . . . inclination that, in the short-run, decreases in credit availability increase bankruptcy filings. But in the long-run, bankruptcy filing rates increase with greater credit availability. Does that mean that potential long-term reductions in credit availability mean long-term reductions in bankruptcy filings?"
Posted: November 5, 2008

Will President-Elect Obama Now Make Chapter 13 Mortgage Modification Part of His First-100-Days Economic Plan?
Excerpt: "Here is a sampling of what the blogosphere is saying about the current prospects for bankruptcy law reform and specifically Chapter 13 mortgage modifications."
Posted: November 7, 2008

New Streamlined Home Mortgage Modification Program: Making Sense of Yet Another Federal Effort to Rescue Homeowners
Excerpt: "On November 11, 2008 the federal government announced another major home mortgage modification program. It is being presented by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which was established by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 signed into law on July 30, 2008, the same agency which took control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in September by authority of that Act. This Bulletin focuses on the bankruptcy aspects of this story ... ."
Posted: November 12, 2008

New Oregon Employment Data: The Trends Behind the News
Excerpt: "Yesterday (11/17/08) the Oregon Employment Department released statewide employment data for October 2008, highlighted by an unusually large 0.9% one-month increase in the unemployment rate to 7.3%. Even though the national average unemployment rate also went up--from 6.1% to 6.4%--this increase took the state in one month from slightly worse to significantly worse than the national average."
Posted: November 18, 2008

New Chapter 13 Mortgage Modification Bill Introduced During Lame-Duck Session
Excerpt: "Earlier this week Senator Richard Durbin introduced another Chapter 13 mortgage modification bill, S.3690, during this lame-duck session of Congress. It is called the Homeowner Assistance and Taxpayer Protection Act."
Posted: November 20, 2008



by Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys

Monday, December 1, 2008

Bankruptcy Courts to Be Hit by Wave of Chapter 11 Reorganizations, Right? Think Again


By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys, Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com


A series of recent articles and blogs have highlighted yet another extremely adverse consequence of our current credit debacle, as it leaps down the economic food chain into corporate bankruptcies: Chapter 11's have quickly become much less favorable vehicles with which to reorganize businesses. This is because 1) the credit squeeze is also greatly diminishing the availability of debtor-in-possession financing, upon which reorganizing Chapter 11's depend, and 2) BAPCPA's Chapter 11 amendments have had some (surprise, surprise) highly detrimental unintended consequences. The resulting radical reduction in the ability of Chapter 11 to keep businesses relatively intact will add to the cycle of business closings, layoffs, and reduced consumer and commercial purchasing power.

Here are summaries of some of the better recent articles and blogs on this issue, with links to them:

A New York Times article of a couple of weeks ago with the headline, "Advantage of Corporate Bankruptcy is Dwindling," cited the examples of Chapter 11's by Linens 'n Things and Mervyns having to go the liquidation route because of the lack of debtor-in-possession financing, with the recent filing by Circuit City anticipated by many to go in the same direction. The problem is aggravated by the fact that in recent years the large DIP lenders have tended to be hedge funds and private equity investors, whose ranks have been thinned, and the survivors often now do not have money to lend, and if they do they want a quick return to assuage their own skittish investors, thus forcing liquidations instead of reorganizations.

"In the (Red): the Business Bankruptcy Blog" has recently had a couple of related stories:

"The Credit Crisis and DIP Financing" refers to the unavailability AND the greater expense of DIP (Debtor-in-Possession) financing when it is available, and the reality that more companies are more deeply leveraged, such as with "second liens, that many companies took on over the past few years when financing was easier to get," leaving these companies with "little or no unencumbered assets to offer a DIP lender as collateral." (So it's not just homeowners who were getting easy second mortgages!)

"The 2005 Bankruptcy Law Changes and Their Impact on Retail Reorganizations" focused on testimony in September 2008 by some bankruptcy professors and a Chapter 11 practitioner, Lawrence C. Gottlieb of the law firm Cooley Godward Kronish LLP, before the U.S. House of Representative's Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, of the Committee on the Judiciary, about "The Disappearance of Retail Reorganization in the Post-BAPCPA Era" . This testimony (the link is specifically to the testimony of Mr. Gottlieb) is a fascinating story of the perfect storm of "the credit crunch, the subprime lending crisis, the slowdown of the housing market and eroding value of retail commercial leases," all contributing to the near impossibility for retailers to emerge from Chapter 11 without liquidation. But notwithstanding these unprecedented economic forces, the testimony pinned much of the blame squarely on BAPCPA:
It is our experience that BAPCPA, with its numerous provisions impacting corporate insolvencies, has made it nearly impossible for retailers to emerge from Chapter 11 under any economic conditions. BAPCPA’s amendment to, and introduction of, some of the more crucial Bankruptcy Code sections affecting the retailer’s ability to meet its liquidity needs and obtain necessary postpetition financing – the lynch pin to any successful retail reorganization effort –has had a devastating effect on the retailer’s ability to reorganize.
The testimony reviews many changes to the Code which in combination, and particularly in the context of this unprecedented economic whirlwind, has had consequences that could not have been intended. By way of illustration, the changes to Section 365(d)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code now give DIP's an absolute maximum of 210 days from the date of filing to assume or reject a commercial real estate lease (without lessor's consent), instead of the prior 60 days PLUS "for cause" extensions routinely granted when the DIP was continuing to perform on the lease obligations.

[T]he fixing of an immutable deadline for the assumption or rejection of commercial real estate leases has dealt a knockout blow to prospective retail reorganizations. From a lender’s perspective, a retailer’s ability to routinely obtain extensions of the assumption/rejection period provided two critical protections. First, a lender could be assured that the retailer was provided with sufficient time to analyze the value of each individual store lease before making the critical decision to assume or reject the lease. Second, lenders were also assured that they would be provided with enough time to conduct a “going-out-of-business” (“GOB”) sale on the premises in the event a decision was subsequently made to terminate the reorganization process. Although both protections play important roles in a lender’s decision to provide postpetition financing, it is the latter protection which is most crucial. Absent the ability to conduct a GOB sale from the debtor’s store locations, a lender is deprived of the most commercially viable location to liquidate the collateralized inventory.
... .
Prior to BAPCPA, lenders were far more willing to finance a debtor’s reorganization, partly because the Bankruptcy Code essentially provided them with an indefinite period of time to assign the debtor’s below-market commercial leases to third parties at a premium in the course of a subsequent liquidation. Revised section 365(d)(4) appreciably lessens the residual value of a debtor’s commercial leases because lenders are left without sufficient time to market those leases in the event the reorganization stalls.

Sounds like the perennial "whipping boy," BAPCPA, deserves some more whipping.



by: Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys

Monday, November 24, 2008

Judge Perris Denies Discharge to Chapter 7 Debtors Under Section 727(a)(4)(A) for Making "a False Oath or Account"


By Andrew Toth-Fejel, Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys, Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

U.STrustee v. Killian and Lesser (In re Killian and Lesser)
Case No. 07-33641-elp7
November 17, 2008
Unpublished

This opinion, in which debtors were denied a Chapter 7 discharge for making a series of written and oral false oaths, is a painful-to-read story about very difficult debtors and their attorney and legal assistant, with a lot of pointing of fingers back and forth among them. It is a lesson in the kind of clients for debtors' attorneys to avoid, or else to educate very thoroughly at the beginning of representation. It also seems to be a lesson, admittedly from the perspective of the "Monday morning quarterback," of a number of important ways the attorney could have done a better job avoiding this situation.


Judge Perris' Holding

Given the egregiousness of the debtors' behavior as described in Judge Perris' factual findings, Judge Perris' decision to deny discharge is not surprising. She recited the four elements of a violation of § 727(a)(4)(A):
(1) the debtor made a false oath in connection with the case; (2) the oath related to a material fact; (3) the oath was made knowingly; and (4) the oath was made fraudulently.
The judge indicated that the first two elements were easily met as she recited a series of false oaths about debtors' assets and business affairs: 1) woefully incomplete original schedules signed under oath, 2) oral false oaths at the meetings of creditors (three meetings were needed), and 3) continued false oaths in amended schedules which still lacked significant information. These written and/or oral false oaths involved omitting numerous significant real estate transactions, continued ownership in significant items of jewelry, nondisclosure of multiple business ownerships, their disposal of jewelry and household furnishings recently purchased for many tens of thousands of dollars, and large amounts of undisclosed income. In the judge's words, debtors "omitted a breathtaking amount of significant financial information."


The key section of the opinion, on the last two elements, was introduced with: "The only remaining question is whether the false oaths were knowingly and fraudulently made." The judge determined as follows:

1) As to debtors' testimony that they were only presented by their attorney's legal assistant with the signature pages of the original bankruptcy documents, it was enough that their signatures represented that the information on them was true when it was not true: "That was a lie." Furthermore, debtors had access to the other pages and had the opportunity to review them before signing. Thus the false oath signatures on the original bankruptcy documents were knowingly and fraudulently made.
2) As to the amended bankruptcy documents, these were also false oaths knowingly and fraudulently made in that the debtors had been warned by the trustee at the original meeting of creditors of the inadequacy of the documents, a draft of the amended documents were emailed to clients, their attorney advised them to review them carefully, and yet they were still signed with a "continued failure to include anywhere near complete information."
3) And as to the debtors' testimony at the various meetings of creditors, the judge did not believe debtors "that their lawyer told them to lie under oath," and in any event "[i[t was the debtors . . . who were under oath" and '[i]t was debtors' obligation to tell the truth, regardless what their counsel may have said." So the oral false oaths were also knowingly and fraudulently made.

In sum, the debtors exhibited "a shocking level of disregard for the obligation to assure accuracy in the information provided in a bankruptcy case." "They utterly disregarded their obligation to tell the truth." The US Trustee met the four elements of

Because the justification for denial of discharge was so strong under § 727(a)(4)(A), Judge Perris did not see a need to go into three other potential statutory bases for denial of discharge.


The Monday Morning Quarterback's Areas of Improvement for Debtors' Counsel

This is a website for bankruptcy attorneys, authored by someone who spent seventeen years first as a creditors' and then mostly debtors' attorney, and then has spent the last eight years working as a paralegal for many attorneys, as an employee and on a contract basis,for those who run a tight ship and for those barely afloat. From these 25 years of varied experience, I have perhaps a better perspective on these kinds of situations than those who have primarily seen this situation from only one angle. And because I have lots of past experience in representing very difficult clients, poorly chosen and perhaps insufficiently "educated," contributing to very difficult ethical problems, I have both sympathy and strong warnings for attorneys who allow themselves and their staff to get sloppy.

In that spirit, here are some attorney-client problems Judge Perris' opinion highlights, all the more important as bankruptcy work heats up and the temptation to cut corners rears its head:

[This portion being edited--please return in a few minutes. Thanks for your interest. Please feel free to comment--I respond to all comments.]



by: Andrew Toth-Fejel
Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys
Andy@BLSforAttorneys.com

Please note that this writer is not licensed to practice law in Oregon. This means that he is not legally permitted to give any legal advice or provide and legal services. This Bulletin and the entire contents of this website is written only for attorneys. and is not intended for the public. If any non-attorney is reading this, you must consult an attorney about ANYTHING you read here. Nothing in this website is intended to be nor should be read as being legal advice to anyone.

© 2008 Bankruptcy Litigation Support for Attorneys